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This paper traces movements of saving and investment in the Japanese 
economy over the four decades after World War II. The postwar decades 
may be divided conveniently into four periods: the reconstruction period 
(1945-1952) in which saving was in absolutely short supply; the normal-
ization period (1952-1959) when the economy returned to normalcy; the 
rapid growth period (1960-1973) when saving and investment were balanced 
at a very high level so as to make rapid growth achievable; and the slow 
grown period (1974-present) in which saving exceeded investment in the 
private economy. 
While Japan's high rate of saving has been much discussed, a number 
of newly industrializing Asian countries have demonstrated similar trends 
in recent years. The paper also presents other international comparisons 
as the capital output ratio, the relative importance of land and housing 
in household wealth, the household lifecycle, the government budget 
balance, and the cost of funds. 
The paper then turns to examine individual sectors of the economy. 
1) The target wealth hypothesis is employed to explain Japan's high 
household savings rate. 2) In the corporate business sector, both saving 
and investment have fallen sharply as the growth rate has fallen and the 
profit rate has declined since the 1970s. 3) Large government deficits 
also attended slower economic growth. 4) In the external sector, the 
current account surplus tended to be small, turning into deficits at the 
time of the two oil shocks. In early 1980s, however, the yen depreciat-
ed, bolstering Japanese exports. Imports did not rise much because of 
relatively cheap primary goods in the international market. Consequent-
ly, the current account surplus grew sharply. 
The Japanese economy approximated the neoclassical model in the 
rapid growth period, and became closer to the Keynesian model in the slow 
growth period. Extensive unemployment did not emerge only because the 
excess saving in the private sector was absorbed by large government 
deficits in the late 1970s. In the early 1980s, excessive private sector 
saving translated into a current account surplus. 
The paper concludes with an inquiry about the future of the saving-
investment balance. Although numerous scenarios are conceivable, one 
thing is certain. Unless the excess of saving over investment in the 
private sector is eliminated, the disequilibria in the government and 
external sectors will persist. A forced solution can very easily lead to 
secular stagnation. 
Econometric Models of the Japanese Economy 
Kazuo Sato 
The macroeconomic balance between saving and investment is crucial 
in maintaining an economy's equilibrium at any given time and in promot-
ing its growth over time* The rate of saving and investment are influ-
enced by different factors and do not necessarily behave in a 
complementary manner. How these two variables are brought into accor-
dance with one another sets the basic tone for an economy's macroeconomic 
performance. Those who adhere to the notion of a classical macroeconomic 
system may argue that equality between saving and investment is achieved 
at the level of full employment through the effective working of the 
price mechanism. This does not seem to have been the case in real 
life—or in Japan after World War II. 
Over the four decades since the end of World War II, the Japanese 
economy has experienced four major phases in its macroeconomic climate: 
recovery in the late 1940s from the economic setbacks caused by the war, 
a return to normalcy in the 1950s, rapid growth through the 1960s and 
early 1970s, and decelerated growth following the first oil shock in 
1973. The rate of saving and investment changed in response to these 
fundamental macroeconomic phases. The economic miracle of the 1960s owes 
a great deal to the steady rise in the saving ratio as the demand for 
investment steadily increased. Much of the trouble experienced since the 
mid-1970s has been the slow decline in private saving compared with a 
sharp fall in investment relative to GDP. 
The role of saving in Japan has changed and popular views of saving 
have been drastically revised. Foreign commentators, up until a few 
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years ago, gave unconditional adulation to the virtue of saving, as well 
as to the success of supply-side policies in general. Now, excess saving 
is often cited as the root cause of Japan1s international economic 
conflicts. 
In this chapter, I present a general account of Japan's postwar 
performance with respect to saving and investment, describe the general 
macroeconomic climate in Japan, and provide a basis for predictions for 
the coming decades. Section I contains a broad historical overview of 
saving and investment in Japan. Section II discusses several salient 
features of Japan's capital and wealth accumulation. Household saving 
and investment behavior are examined in section III and business saving 
and investment behavior in section IV. Section V reviews the overall 
balance of saving and investment in Japan through a look at the govern-
ment and the external sectors. Section VI contains some concluding 
remarks and some predictions of future trends. 
I. Historical Overview 
While the principal focus of this chapter is on the period after 
World War II, it is fitting to first review Japan's long-term record over 
the last hundred years. Table 1 outlines gross domestic investment and 
components of gross national saving as per cent of GNP or GDP in 
quinquennial averages. As seen in Figure 1, the saving ratio was rela-
tively modest prior to World War II except in such extraordinary periods 
as 1915-19 when the World War I superboom brought about huge export 
surpluses and 1935-39 and 1940-44 when private saving was mobilized to 
finance the war. When such unique situations are discounted, net 
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national saving was about 5 per cent of GNP, which corresponds to the low 
growth rate of 3.0 per cent per annum between 1885-89 and 1935-39. The 
2 
capital-output ratio as implied by these ratios is 2.0. 
In contrast to the modest prewar record, the saving ratio registered 
a remarkable performance in the postwar period. After a precipitous fall 
in private saving in the immediate postwar years, the saving ratio 
steadily recovered through the early 1970s. In the rapid growth period 
of the 1960s and the early 1970s, net national saving was nearly 25 per 
cent of GDP. Correspondingly, the growth rate was also high--a little 
over 10 per cent per year. The capital-output ratio rose to a level 
slightly greater than 2. The saving ratio began to decline in the late 
1970s in response to slower economic growth, but this decrease can be 
primarily attributed to a decline in government saving, although private 
saving also declined by at a slower rate. 
This brief overview illustrates the interaction among saving, 
investment, and economic growth. If the saving ratio had not rapidly 
increased after World War II, Japan1s remarkable postwar economic growth 
could not have been achieved. The increases in the saving ratio may be 
explained by the rapid increases in income experienced by most Japanese 
households. Such a point must be carefully examined. Another condition 
often cited as an explanatory factor is that Japan's high saving ratio 
reflects the frugality of Japanese households under the strict discipline 
3 
of the _ie or family system. However, saving claimed a much smaller 
fraction of household income in the heyday of the ie_ system; therefore, 
the saving ratio is apparently a variable conditioned principally by 
macroeconomic forces rather than cultural factors. 
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When the war was officially ended on August 15, 1945, Japan1s 
economy was in shambles. Productive capacity was devastated, agricultur-
al production plummeted, and with real income about half its prewar 
level, households were at the starvation level. Many urban families, 
including overseas repatriates, were forced to return to village for 
temporary shelter. The population in rural areas rose to above 50 per 
cent of the total population, reversing the steady downward trend since 
the early Meiji period. Private saving was virtually nonexistent. The 
shortage in the supply of goods ignited rampant inflation, which took the 
entire Occupation period to bring under control. In the meantime, a 
number of economic "democratization" measures were enforced by the 
Occupation authorities: land reform, dissolution of the zaibatsu, and 
labor unionization. 
The Peace Treaty restored sovereignty to Japan in 1952, and infla-
tion was finally quenched. The prewar peak level of production was 
regained early in this period, and the economy began to function normal-
ly. Industry began to expand, and the population started to return to 
the cities from rural areas. By the end of the decade, the proportion of 
workers in agriculture fell to 30 per cent of the total labor force. 
Saving-cum-investment continued to rise as a per cent of GDP. The major 
constraint on growth at this time, as well as in the early 1960s, was the 
balance of payments. 
The miraculous economic growth of Japan took place in the brief span 
of 14 years from 1960-1973. Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 
10 per cent, quadrupling total GDP. Behind this spectacular growth were 
massive imports of technology, especially in manufacturing, raising 
Japan1s international competitiveness by leaps and bounds. By the 
-5-
mid-1960s, the balance-of-payments constraints on growth was removed, 
Growth acceleration required that a large fraction of GDP be devoted to 
capital formation. Japan1s so-called miracle lies in the fact that 
saving was mobilized in greater amounts to match the demand for invest-
ment, keeping the Japanese economy from overheating. Industry expanded 
at a tremendous rate, absorbing most of the population from rural areas. 
The agricultural labor force had declined to about 10 percent of the 
total labor force by the end of the period. 
Like other advanced economies, Japan entered a new era of deceler-
ated growth after the first oil crisis of 1973-74, when stagflation fell 
upon Japan. However, Japan managed a swift recovery and has maintained a 
reasonably good growth rate (at least internationally), kept inflation 
under control, and experienced relatively low rates of unemployment. The 
Japanese economy was faced with a new set of problems. An economic 
growth declined, the demand for new capital fell drastically. Saving, 
however, did not fall at a comparable rate. Hence, an excess of saving 
over investment began to appear in the private sector. At the same time, 
the government reached a structural imbalance between revenues and 
expenditures, when slower economic growth resulted in the stagnation of 
government revenues but government expenditures continued to rise. This 
shortfall of revenues was financed by running deficits in the central 
government account. While this development helped to absorb the excess 
in private saving without incurring unemployment, it also resulted in a 
mounting accumulation of public debt. 
Thus, over the postwar decades, the balance of saving and investment 
has undergone several transitions reflecting the changes in Japan1s 
macroeconomic climate. At this point, it is worth noting that the 
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Japanese government remained steadfastly pro-saving--an attitude with a 
historical basis, but very notable in the decades following World War II. 
The tax burden was also kept relatively low, especially on property 
income and capital gains. 
II. Japan's Accumulation in International Perspective 
Saving and investment accumulate into wealth and capital respective-
ly. This section compares Japan!s flow and stock of wealth and capital 
accumulation with that of other countries. 
A. Overall Saving Ratio 
Neither too little nor too much saving is beneficial is sustaining 
economic growth. A certain balance among saving, investment, and growth 
must be attained. High potential growth can only be realized if the 
economy succeeds in mobilizing an adequate supply of savings or in 
reducing the amount of investment required. 
Japan was able to expand saving in the rapid growth period. In this 
regard, Japan's performance is neither unique nor singular. Confronted 
with equally high potential growth, a few newly-industrializing countries 
have demonstrated their ability to allocate a large proportion of nation-
al output to capital formation. There are also a few developed countries 
with saving ratios which exceed that of Japan. 
B. Capital-Output Ratio 
When the supply of funds (savings) is less than the demand for funds 
(investment), a balance may be attained by reducing the latter. For this 
to take place without lowering the growth rate, the capital-output ratio 
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must also be lowered. Since saving was in short supply in Japan through 
the rapid growth period, did Japan, in fact, reduce its capital-output 
ratio? Though capital estimates are subject to statistical pitfalls, 
statistics are now available for a number of OECD countries allowing the 
comparison of broad orders of magnitude. 
Table 2 compares the ratio of next fixed capital stock to total GDP 
in 1970 and 1980 in current prices for several countries. It is readily 
observable that, of the six countries with complete data, Japan had the 
lowest aggregate capital-output ratio. The ratio was especially low in 
1970, suggesting that the capital supply was still limited at the end of 
the rapid growth period. 
In looking at the individual components of capital, we find that, 
with regard to the stock of producer durables, the capital-output ratio 
in Japan was not markedly different than that of other countries, espe-
cially by the end of the 1970s after substantial increases in the ratio 
over the decades. Thus, Japan is more or less similar to other major 
4 industrial countries in the employment of productive capital. 
The contrast is much sharper in the case of housing stock. The 
housing stock-output ratio was definitely low in Japan in 1970. Even 
after a substantial expansion in housing stock through the 1970s, the 
ratio was still low by international standards in 1980. This finding is 
by no means surprising, as it is generally acknowledged both in and out 
of Japan that Japan1s housing conditions lag far behind its general 
standard of living, thus justifying the European Community1s sarcastic 
description of Japanese dwellings as "rabbit hutches'1 a few years back. 
In short, Japan economized on housing in order to deploy its limited 
supply of capital in more productive areas. 
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C. Household Wealth 
While wealth and capital are two sides of the same coin, they must 
be considered independently except at the national economy level. In the 
household sector, wealth includes land which is not considered capital 
because it is not reproducible. Aside from land, household wealth 
consists primarily of financial assets (less liabilities). Physical 
assets included in household wealth are dwellings owned by household as 
residences and business capital stock employed by unincorporated busi-
nesses which are considered a part of the household sector. In Japan, 
the composition of household wealth differs considerably from other 
countries. 
First, because land is unaugmentable in quantity, its market value 
tends to rise in a growing economy as the demand for land continues to 
increase. This fact makes land an important component of private wealth. 
In Japan, inhabitable land constitutes only a small fraction of total 
o 
national land. Furthermore, metropolitan areas are overcongested. 
Consequently, urban land, both residential and commercial, is extremely 
9 
expensive in Japan. Although Japan's total land area is only 1/25 of 
that of the United States, the former would cost more than the latter. 
For this reason, land occupies an overwhelming position in Japan1s 
household wealth portfolio. 
Another well-known feature of individuals1 portfolio of wealth in 
Japan is the small position that corporate equities hold in it. House-
hold financial assets are largely of fixed-claim types which are vulnera-
ble to inflation. Individuals hold their financial savings primarily in 
bank deposits, postal savings, and the like. On the one hand, this 
financial structure has given special power to financial intermediaries 
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in their role as providers of credit. On the other hand, great 
significance is attached to the special tax treatment of interest income. 
Table 3 compares the composition of household wealth in Japan and 
the United States. Expressed as a per cent of disposable income, debt is 
currently about the same in the two countries. Financial assets, 
however, make up a smaller proportion of the household wealth portfolio 
in Japan. Therefore, net financial assets are significantly lower in 
Japan than in the United States. 
D. Household Income, Saving, and Capital Formation 
Analyses of household saving often emphasize the functional distri-
bution of income among different types of household—workers, renters, 
proprietors, retired workers, and the like--as they tend to exhibit 
different propensities to save. The advanced economies differ from one 
another in this regard, as the income of proprietors is relatively high 
in the continental European countries and very low in North America with 
Japan somewhere in between. As a substantial portion of proprietors1 may 
be imputed to their labor services, labor income within household income 
in comparable among these countries, ranging from 70 to 80 per cent of 
total household income. Any remaining differences in the income share of 
labor can be attributed primarily to the differences in the importance of 
transfer income between these countries, especially in social security 
payments. By the end of the 1970s, social security payments were as 
developed in Japan as in Canada, the United States, and the United 
12 
Kingdom, although much less so than in continental Europe. 
With respect to household saving and capital formation, macroeconom-
ic theories often neglect the fact that a large part of household saving 
is absorbed into household capital formation. The ten OECD countries for 
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which household gross saving and capital formation statistics are avail-
able can be divided into two groups. In the high-saving group made up of 
Italy5 Japan, and Portugal, household gross saving is about 20 per cent, 
household gross capital formation 10 per cent, and net lending 10 per 
cent of total GDP. In the low-saving group comprising of the remaining 
seven countries (Canada, the United States, Austria, Finland, France, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), gross saving is about 10 per cent of the 
GDP, most of which goes to gross capital formation, with net lending 
making up only a small fraction of total saving. In Japan, the household 
sector has been an important source of funds for the rest of the economy. 
E. Government Consumption, Saving, and Investment 
The government sector has come to take up an increasing larger share 
of national income all over the world. The fiscal scale of the Japanese 
government, however, has remained relatively small with respect to public 
consumption. The share of total GDP going to the final consumption 
expenditure of the general government is lower in Japan than among other 
advanced countries—it has been about 10 per cent in the early 1980s as 
against 20 per cent in Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with the 
United States, France, and Italy falling in between. Japan1s low level 
of government consumption can be partly attributed to its nearly nonexis-
tent defense expenditure of barely one per cent of GDP as against 6 per 
cent in the United States. Japan's low government share may be somewhat 
overexaggerated in national accounting statistics due especially to the 
13 
understatement of national health expenditure. With proper 
adjustments, the share of government consumption expenditures may be 
realistically raised by 4 percentage points, reducing the gap between 
Japan and other countries. 
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Another factor which may emphasize the Japanese governments econom-
ic activities is the sizable public expenditure on capital formation--6 
per cent of GDP in the early 1980s as compared to 3 per cent in France, 
Germany, Italy, and Canada and 2 percent in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. It must be noted that until the mid-1970s, government 
capital formation was more than fully financed by government saving under 
the balanced-budget principle that had prevailed, making the government 
an important source of net national saving in the postwar period. All 
factors considered, the government claims nearly as much of GDP in Japan 
as elsewhere. 
F. The Cost of Funds 
The cost of funds influences both saving and investment. Has the 
cost of funds been lower in Japan than elsewhere? As reported in Table 4 
for the period 1982-84, nominal rates of interest have been relatively 
14 
low in Japan. However, real rates of interest have not been 
15 particularly low as the rate of inflation has been low in Japan. 
For businesses, the corporate income tax rate in another important 
cost element. This tax rate continued to rise through the 1970s and is 
now among the highest internationally. In addition, considering the 
relatively high depreciation cost, the user cost of capital has not been 
low? in Japan. 
G. Demographic Conditions 
The structure of the population is an important determinant of 
personal saving behavior. Although the Japanese population is still 
younger than American and European population as shown in Table 5, it is 
expected to age rapidly over the next quarter century. The proportion of 
the population aged 65 and over is projected to rise from the current 
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level of 10 per cent to 13.6 per cent in 1995 and 17.1 per cent in 
2005. Another important related feature is the fact that many older 
workers, especially male, continue to work after retirement age, even 
though the proportion of aged persons engaged in paid labor has been 
1 O 
falling, reflecting the slackening demand for older workers. Now that 
Japan's life expectancy is one of the highest in the world (80 for 
females and 74 males, as of 1984), how to satisfy older workers1 willing-
ness to work will be difficult question. Their desire to remain in the 
labor force may even be stronger in the future, as the aging population 
is sure to bring debasement to social security benefits, as the burden of 
providing social security payments on the working population must be kept 
19 to a reasonably tolerable level. 
A related problem is the observed tendency of increased female 
participation in employment. The female labor force participation ratio 
began to rise form a low of 45.7 per cent in 1975 to 49.0 per cent in 
1983, in response to the increasing need to supplement household income 
which ceased to improve in the late 1970s, as the income tax and social 
security burden continued to rise. 
As the household sector has been a chief source of saving in all 
economy and the saving behavior of the country is overwhelmingly identi-
fied with household saving behavior, the next section further studies 
household saving and investment behavior and its impact on general 
savings and investment. 
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III. Household Savings and Investment 
A major hurdle in aggregate studies of household saving is the 
diversity of demographic, economic, and social characteristics among 
households. First of all, households must be divided into distinct 
groups of differing economic status--such as farmers, nonfarm proprie-
tors, workers, rentiers, and so on. Even within the relatively homoge-
neous group of worker households, distinctions must be made among young 
unattached worker households, households with a male head working, 
households with both husband and wife employed, households with no male 
heads, and households of retired workers* Family size is also an impor-
tant variable, as is house ownership, because household budgets differ 
considerably between homeowners and renters. Ideally, households should 
be cross-classified for a complete analysis, but such detailed data for 
individual household is not readily accessible to individual 
20 
researchers. Although this makes the available studies in this field 
less than satisfactory, the rest of this chapter relies heavily on their 
results and observations. 
Table 6 and Figure 2 examine the changes in household saving ratios 
beginning in 1951. I applied statistics from two series taken directly 
from their original sources--one from the family budget survey of worker 
households (Family Income and Expenditure Survey, FIES) and the other 
from that of farm households (Farm Household Economy Survey, FHES). The 
others are from the official National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
20a 
prepared by the Economic Planning Agency, both the new and old series. 
As income and saving are defined differently in these, sources, the saving 
ratios are not strictly comparable in terms of levels. Their movements 
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over time, however, are broadly similar, enabling us to draw broad 
21 generalizations from the data. 
Following the period of reconstruction (1945-51) when rampant 
inflation made household savings worthless and income levels were severe-
ly depressed, the decade of the 1950s saw a rapid increase in the saving 
ratio. By 1952, inflation had been brought under control, the economy 
started to function more normally, and individuals began to think once 
again family savings. In an attempt to recover the lot ground in asset 
accumulation, the saving ratio rose year after year throughout the 1950s. 
By the end of the decade, the saving ratio had attained and then exceeded 
22 the prewar level. This observation led to the popular belief that the 
23 
saving ratio would soon stop rising. 
This prediction seemed to have been realized in the early 1960s, but 
the saving ratio began to rise once again with renewed vigor in the 
mid-1960s. To explain this resurgence, one may argue that consumers, 
faced with a rapid increase in income in this rapid growth period, failed 
to make swift adjustment in their consumption level which lagged behind 
24 income, causing a positive response in the saving ratio. One can also 
cite other demographic and institutional factors such as the underdevel-
oped social security system (forcing individuals to increase saving for 
retirement as anticipation of a higher consumption level in the future 
necessitates increased current saving) and the underdeveloped consumer 
credit system (forcing individuals to save before being able to purchase 
houses and consumer durables). For whatever reason, the saving ratio 
continued to rise through the rest of the rapid growth period, peaking in 
1974, the year of double-digit inflation with a 24 per cent increase in 
25 the CPI. 
-15-
The saving ratio began to decline from its peak in 1974 as income 
growth slowed. In fact, as the burdens imposed by income tax and social 
security payments increased at the same time, disposable income growth 
was minisucule. If the permanent income hypothesis were to hold in the 
rapid growth period, the saving ratio would have been expected to fall 
swiftly. However, the decline has been relatively small. While the NIPA 
saving ratio has shown a continued decline, the FIE3 and FHES saving 
ratios have been stable in the last two years under study. In addition, 
although both social security benefits and the consumer finance system 
have recently been developing at a respectable rate, they apparently have 
not been strong enough to further accelerate the decline in the saving 
ratio. 
A. Composition of Saving by Source 
If we can determine the composition of saving by source, i.e., by 
type of income, it would better facilitate our understanding of the 
mechanics involved in saving. Because of the poor quality of available 
basic data, I have been forced to indulge in highly conjectural guess-
work. What is important is not the actual figures, but rather the broad 
orders of magnitude of the results. For this exercise, household income 
is classified into three types: labor income, capital income, and trans-
fer income. In the case of Japan, this trichotomous classification is 
appropriate in view of the income tax system under which incomes are 
27 taxed separately by source (see Table 7). 
Labor income. Labor income is the total of wages and salaries less 
employeesf contributions to social security (which are nontaxable). 
Income taxes, both national and local, are withdrawn at the source from 
paychecks. Property income, such as interest and dividends, are either 
28 
wholly exempt from tax (under the small-saver tax exemption) or 
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separately taxed at the source at a flat rate, justifying the segregation 
of labor and property income. 
Capital income. This classification covers proprietors1 income and 
property income. Proprietors are given the status of quasi-corporations 
in the income tax code and their incomes (after the exclusion of wages 
and salaries to themselves and family labor) are taxed as corporate 
income. For this reason, proprietors1 income can be lumped together with 
property income. Property income consists of interest, dividends, and 
rent receipts. Under the small-saver tax exemption system, a large part 
of interest and dividend incomes is not subject to taxation either 
29 (legally or illegally), with the residual being taxed at the source at 
30 
a flat rate. Imputed rent on owner-occupied dwelling (net of capital 
consumption) is excluded here from capital income. 
Transfer income. Transfer payments such as social security bene-
fits, social assistance grants, employers1 contributions to private 
pension funds, and imputed rent are included in this classification, and 
interest on consumer debt is deducted. Although social security benefits 
are a major source of disposable income for the retired and are taxable 
in Japan, it is likely that these benefits usually lie below the taxable 
limit and savings out of this type of income are probably small. It may 
be assumed that no tax and no saving are made out of social assistant 
grants to the poor and indigent. Imputed rent is free to tax and con-
sumed fully. These entries are lumped together as the second component 
(3b) of transfer and other income in Table 7. Employers1 contribution to 
private pension funds which, by definition, are not taxed nor consumed, 
is entered independently under 3a. 
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The composition of household income after these manipulations is 
shown in Table 7. In order to determine the after-tax income by source, 
the individual tax rates must be known, in addition to the sector-average 
tax rate. I have assumed above that the tax on income type 3 (t ) is 
zero as a first approximation. If either t or t? is known, the other 
can be determined residually. Since income tax on wages and salaries is 
withdrawn at the source, t can be determined from tax statistics. As 
32 
reported elsewhere, it has been found that t closely approximates t. 
Based on this fact, I have set t1 = t = 8 per cent; therefore, t9 = 14 
per cent. The t^ rate is low but by no means implausible, as a large 
part of interest and dividend income is nontaxable. 
The same steps must be repeated with respect to saving. The sector 
average of s is known. We have assumed that s,. is equal to 1 and s«-to
 3a ^ 3b 
equal to 0. Then, if either s or s is known, the other can be 
determined residually. The NIPA definition of s is already estimated at 
14 per cent in the FIES, leaving an assumed value of 37 per cent for s^. 
In interpreting the size of s?, note that the retired households may 
spend their accumulated savings. Their dissaving is netted out of saving 
from capital income. 
The last column of Table 7 compares the composition of saving by 
type of income. The results show that the proportion of employers1 
contributions to private pension funds are sizable, and of the remainder, 
labor income and capital income claim about equal shares of saving. 
Thus, worker households1 saving is a very important component of total 
personal saving. In contrast to ordinary worker households in the United 
States, those in Japan save a considerable amount, accounting in part for 
33 the high personal saving ratio in Japan. 
-18-
34 B. Income Tax and Savings 
When the proposed implementation of the Green Card system was hotly 
35 debated a few years ago, the main controversy centered on whether the 
discontinuation of the small-saver tax exemption program would result in 
a reduction of saving. Although tax revenue was expected to increase, it 
was feared that such a situation might lead to a sapping of economic 
vitality. In general, it is believed that a heavier tax on household 
income will discourage saving. It is supposition correct? 
First? let us consider labor income. An increase in t naturally 
reduced disposable income. If the stream of disposable income over a 
lifetime retains its initial time profile, consumption will be reduced by 
an equal proportion. Therefore, the ratio of saving to disposable income 
will remain virtually unchanged, and s is not likely to be greatly 
affected. 
Next, consider capital income. A rise in t also reduces disposable 
income. How would small savers react? If their savings are mostly for 
retirement and saving out of property income is earmarked for that 
purpose, they may find it necessary to raise their saving ratio out of 
capital income. However, for large savers interested in saving for 
saving1s sake, namely to accrue wealth as a status symbol, the heavier 
tax bite deteriorates their relative wealth position. In face of such an 
unwelcome development, they may also decide to increase savings. As s^  
36 
increases, saving out of before-tax income may remain unchanged. 
Therefore, the expected adverse effects of an increased tax on saving may 
be minimal. 
-19-
C. Social Security and Saving 
It was once a widely held view that Japanese households tended to 
save more for old age, due to Japan*s underdeveloped social security 
system. Now that the social security system has attained a respectable 
position in the national economy, has total saving declined? 
The argument is as follows. Since the social security system 
provides spendable income to households after retirement, social security 
contributions made during working years will substitute for private 
saving. The national accounting convention excludes social security 
contributions (by employers and employees) form household income and 
saving figures. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in households1 
social security saving should be accompanied by a reduction in their 
personal saving. 
There are at least two reservations to this intuitive argument. 
First, while an increase in social security contributions may reduce 
working households1 personal saving, an increase in social security 
benefits helps retired worker households to reduce dissaving. It is 
therefore not entirely clear if total saving is thereby reduced or 
raised. Second, the availability of social security benefits may induce 
workers to retire early. Workers may then be encouraged to increase 
their savings during their working years to make up for a shorter work 
life. These two opposing effects may or may not lower the personal 
-_- 37 saving ratio. 
It seems, especially in Japan, that empirical evidence is not yet 
conclusive on the effect of social security on saving. I tentatively 
conclude that the development of social security has had a relatively 
minor effect, if any at all, on the personal saving ratio. Other factors 
must have exerted an overridingly strong influence on saving. 
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D. Popular Saving Hypotheses 
How can the movement of Japan's personal saving ratio over time, as 
seen in Figure 2, be explained? This question has proved to be a chal-
lenging topic that has attracted many explanations by economists, even 
today. Here, I discuss two of the principal hypotheses found in the 
empirical literature — the permanent income hypothesis and the bonus 
hypothesis. For other views, readers are referred to the competent 
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surveys available elsewhere. 
The permanent income hypothesis. This hypothesis, mentioned above, 
has seen extensive application in econometric literature. Its simplest 
version states that consumption is a certain proportion (k) of permanent 
income (YP) Thus, saving (S), which is a residual from current income 
(Y), is given by S = Y - kY . The saving ration then is s = kY /Y. If 
expectations are adaptive, Y falls short of Y when Y has been growing at 
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a high rate, leading to a rise in s. In other words, households are 
slow to adjust their consumption level when income is rising rapidly. 
This argument may account for the rise in the saving ratio experienced 
through the rapid growth period. However, as the rise continued, there 
must have been a corresponding fall in k--the propensity to consume out 
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of permanent income. Reasons for this fall are not property explained. 
Conversely, when income growth slows, the saving ratio should fall 
relatively swiftly. The fall in s, however, has been comparatively slow 
since the mid-1970s. It seems that the permanent income hypothesis is 
too simplistic to adequately explain the changes in household saving 
behavior in Japan. 
The bonus hypothesis. Another popular explanation for Japan's high 
personal saving ratio is the well-known bonus hypothesis. This 
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hypothesis, often favored by the general public, maintains that Japan's 
work households save mainly from their semi-annual bonuses. Studies 
comparing the proportion of bonuses in total annual earnings have found a 
strong convariation between this proportion and the household saving 
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ratio. Many economists side with this hypothesis. 
Bonuses are paid twice a year, in summer and winter, and on average 
amount to a couple months1 salary each. These payments make family 
budgeting easier in the face of pronounced seasonality in household 
spending for summer and winter festivities, as well as Japan's social 
custom of exchanging gifts among relatives, friends, close business 
associates, and clients. While bonuses were originally a reward for 
meritorious service, the actual practice today is to give bonuses to 
every employee equitably, the sizes in proportion to the regular monthly 
pay scale. For the civil services, this proportion is stipulated by law. 
In private companies, however, it varies from year to year subject to the 
outcome of collective bargaining and is positively related to each 
individual companyfs business performance. 
According to the popular bonus hypothesis, it is these fluctuations 
or uncertainties that endow bonuses with the characteristics of transito-
ry income with respect to the permanent income hypothesis. Regular wages 
and salaries are considered to be permanent or normal income and are 
applied primarily to regular consumption. On the other hand, workers 
consider bonus payments as supernumerary income and allocate this income 
substantially to saving, thereby aligning regular monthly expenditures to 
regular monthly pay checks. Whatever they save, therefore, is saved out 
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of their semi-annual bonuses. 
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In response to positive business performance during the rapid growth 
period, the size of bonus payments increased at a faster rate than did 
regular wages. Thus, the proportion of bonuses to total annual earnings 
rose steadily until 1974* For the opposite reason, it has been falling 
since then, and the worker households1 saving ratio has followed suit. 
The bonus hypothesis, therefore, seemingly explains Japanese workers1 
saving behavior. 
Bonus payments may make it psychologically and practically easier 
for workers to save by sparing the self-discipline necessary in their 
46 budgeting exercise. But it would be an error to insist that therefore 
bonuses are the primary source of saving. Consider what would follow if 
the bonus system were eliminated. Would worker households decrease their 
level of saving? The answer must be no. Workers would be forced to be 
much more strict in their monthly budgeting but would continue to save as 
much as before, as long as their need to save remains as powerful. It 
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appears that the bonus hypothesis mistakes form for substance. 
Why then have the personal saving ratio and the bonus-earnings ratio 
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covaried so closely? Kosai and Ogino offer an intriguing explanation. 
Knowing that it is easier to save out of bonuses, workers opt to save 
more out of bonus payments than out of regular wages as a portion of 
given income. This explanation, however, misses an important point, 
namely, the fact that the bonus-earnings ratio itself has changed in 
response to changes in economic conditions, especially the tightness of 
the labor market. Faced with the shortage of labor, firms offered 
greater bonuses to attract more workers. In such a situation, the firm!s 
productive capacities tend to be fully utilized, providing the where-
withal with which bonuses could be paid. The bonus-earings ratio reached 
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its peak in 1974 when the labor market was at its tightest. It must be 
that worker households' saving decisions were influenced by the same set 
of influences that determined the bonus-earnings ratio. In other words, 
the covariation between the saving ratio and the bonus-earnings ration 
does not necessarily imply that one determines the other, but that the 
49 two ratios may have been simultaneously influenced by common factors. 
E. The Target Wealth Hypothesis 
Neither the permanent income hypothesis nor the bonus hypothesis are 
satisfactory in explaining Japan's household saving behavior. I propose 
that the target wealth hypothesis, in which individuals save in order to 
attain a certain target of wealth relative to income, better explains the 
character of household saving in Japan. In the case of Japan, it has 
been the steady rise income ration that has exerted profound influence on 
the saving ratio, and changes in this ratio will determine future trends. 
This approach has an additional appeal in that both financial saving and 
capital formation can be dealt with in a single framework of analysis, 
and the effect of capital gains on saving can also be easily taken into 
account. Furthermore, not only economic and demographic factors, but 
also sociological and even cultural factors, can be examined insofar as 
they affect the target wealth-income ratio. 
The formal model. Each individual sets a different wealth target 
(W*) relative to current income (Y), depending on the stage in the 
lifecycle and current economic status. These individual wealth targets 
can be aggregated relative to aggregate income, and individuals as a 
whole save as if to attain the target wealth. Let w* be this aggregate 
target wealth over all individuals, may change in response to general 
trends concerning the desirable target wealth-income ratio, as well as to 
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•c and social charac-
compositional changes in the demographic, economi , 
teristics of households. 
By disregarding capital gains for the time being, 
identity S = AW where W is the stock of wealth at the end o pe 
t.52 If the wealth target is instantaneously achieved, we have 
Dividing this relation through Y , we have 
where s = S /Y . In this simple case, the saving ratio depends on two 
factors: income growth and changes in target wealth. Thus, when the 
saving ratio is observed to be rising while income growth is stable, the 
rise must be attributed to steady increases in w*. When income growth is 
deflected downward, the saving ratio may not fall as quickly as w* 
continues to rise. This seems to describe what occurred in Japan through 
the rapid growth period and the slow growth period. If wealth adjustment 
is relatively quick, the actual wealth-income ratio (w) closely follows 
the target wealth-income ratio (w*).53 Table 8 and Fi&nrp ^ ni *. 
-Lj-gujLe j illustrate 
the changes in w over time. 
Types of wealth. As wealth is not homogeneous, it
 is necessary to 
examine its major components separately. In th-ic o i 
r J --11 LUIS analvsi ^  T A 4 ^ • 
-Y-is, i distinguish 
three components, namely: land (W.) which consist- -.- -
1 wists of farm land (W ) 
and urban residential land (W^) ; physical assets (WJ „hich ^ 
dwellings and business assets of noncorporate b " 
cial assets (W ), the difference between orn-o *• 
-ncial assets (W } - , 
debt (W3d). These components of wealth are divirt a u 3f d by household 
disposable income to yield respective wealth-' 
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In analyzing changes in w, it is necessary to take capital gains 
(KG) into account. From the identity S + KGt = AWt, the following 
relation readily follows: 
where x = KG /Y . (All variables are in nominal terms.) Thus, capital 
gains raise the actual wealth-income ratio without any saving. Assets 
differ in appreciation by capital gains. For land, the new supply is 
negligible so that the observed changes in w can be almost entirely 
attributed to capital gains. For physical assets which are reproducible, 
capital gains arise due to general inflation. Changes in w^ therefore 
are attributed only marginally to capital gains and mostly to increases 
in supply. For financial assets and debt, capital gains have been 
nominal, because these financial instruments are of almost wholly 
fixed-claim types and are susceptible to erosion in value whenever 
inflation breaks out. In the following subsection, historical changes in 
these three individual wealth-income ratios are examined. 
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Land. w has shown somewhat complicated patterns of change. It 
was at a peak in 1960, and after a fall, peaked once again in 1972-73. A 
subsequent decline and comeback followed. These changes arose as a 
composite of two components, namely, farm land and urban land (see Table 
9). 
With respect to farm land, w
 f peaked in the mid-1950s and has 
declined steadily ever since except in 1972-73. A simple explanation of 
this phenomenon is that the total area of farm land has declined only 
slightly over time. The price of farm land recovered rapidly in the 
early 1950s from a very depressed level after World War II due to the 
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farm land reform initiated by the Occupation Forces. Thus, the value of 
farm land increased far more rapidly than household income. However, the 
farm land price increases slowed to the pace observed in the general 
price index. As real household income was expanding in the meantime, w 
steadily declined. The small hump observed for 1972-73 was the outcome 
of the land speculation boom caused by the notorious Japanese Archipelago 
Reconstruction Plan of Premier Kakuei Tanaka. 
In contrast, the ratio of urban (residential) land to household 
income, w- , exhibited a very strong upward trend until 1973. An 
explanation for this phenomenon is that the population, forced back to 
farms after World War II, began to return to the cities, in particular, 
the three metropolitan areas of Tokyo-Yokohama, Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe, and 
Nagoya. The three areas together account for only 10 per cent of the 
total national land area but accommodate today nearly a half of the 
population (36 per cent in 1955 and 47 per cent in 1984). As people 
migrated into the narrow Pacific Costal Belt Area, housing had to be 
provided and farm land was successively converted into residential sites. 
The continuing demand for new residential land brought urban land prices 
up at an astronomical rate, especially during the rapid growth period. 
The land speculation boom raised urban land prices sky-high in 1972-73. 
The bubble broke in 1974 and urban land prices declined for the first 
time in the midst of double-digit inflation. A lull followed for the 
next few years as the housing demand was in a doldrum. However, another 
recovery in w1 began in 1977. 
This brief explanation of the movements of w-r and w, clearly F
 If lu J 
indicates that the fundamental determinant of their changes is 
industrialization-cum-urbanization. It should be kept in mind however, 
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that they are essentially demand-determined. w is the result of 
accumulation only indirectly. Rather, the process of accumulation is 
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conditioned by w , as I shall argue later. 
Physical assets. The physical assets of the household sector 
consist of dwellings (50 per cent), building and structures used by 
unincorporated businesses (30 per cent), and other business assets 
including inventories (20 per cent). Thus, as a first approximation, let 
us identify w^ with housing. The relative price of real assets remained 
secularly stable (see Table 9). Therefore, the persistent increase in w9 
which has been observed in the last two decades is mostly due to real 
increases. With respect to dwellings, the following observations can be 
made. The average size of dwellings has shown only a moderate 
56 increase. Therefore, the real increase in w is due primarily to more 
expensive buildings of the same size, namely, from more costly quality 
57 improvements. Needless to say, such improvements are made possible by 
rising income. 
Yet, as I noted in section II, Japan has a long way to go before 
bringing Japan's housing conditions to the level observed in America and 
Europe. As overcongestion of metropolitan areas will continue unabated, 
it is not likely that the average size of dwelling units will expand 
dramatically. As far as space is concerned, Japanese people must COntin-
ue to live in "rabbit hutchesff whether they like them or not. They can 
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and will spend more on furnishings and the like, but definitely not on 
additional space. 
Financial assets. Both total assets and liabilities have increased, 
the former more than the latter—resulting in an increase in the differ-
ence denoted by w . For worker households, the Family Saving Survey 
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reveals that most debt arises from loans related to housing. Further-
more- observe that w has been roughly of the same order of magnitude as 
w . Changes in w represent the household sector1s net lending to the 
rest of the economy. 
As for gross financial assets in general, assets required for 
transactions, i.e., currency and demand deposits, have maintained a 
stable fraction of household income. Corporate equities (at market 
value), on the other hand, had been steadily declining over time—the 
other side of the declining ownership of corporate stocks by individual 
investors. The observed increase in w _ therefore is attributed to time 
deposits, long-term securities, and life insurance equities. 
Having examined each w independently, now consider them together. 
w is primarily demand-determined. Hence, w should be excluded from 
total w in considering the wealth target, w and w^ are supply-
determined. While w has stopped increasing since 1979, w continued to 
rise even in the depressed conditions of recent years. I argue that w 
has been rising (as a target) partly because of the continued increase in 
w and partly because of the demographic transition occurring in Japan. 
The rise in households1 equity in social security has apparently had no 
detectable effect on private saving. As long as w* continued to rise, s 
fell only slowly even when income growth slowed. This accounts for the 
relatively sluggish downward adjustment in s since 1974. 
Housing demand, wealth target, and saving behavior. For worker 
households subject to lifecycle phases, there are two major incentives 
to save: one is for purchasing houses and the other for preparing for 
retirement living. 
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The first need comes in their early to mid-careers. There has been 
a very strong desire among Japanese families to live in dwellings they 
themselves own, despite the fact that housing is quite expensive in 
Japan. The proportion of owner-occupied dwellings to all dwellings has 
steadfastly been slightly above 60 per cent, a level comparable to that 
in the United States where owning onefs home has been easier until 
recently. In Japan, a house and its site are as a rule one package. 
This, of course, makes the unit price of a dwelling extremely high 
relative to income. By the same token, house ownership is not only a 
good inflation hedge but also a good investment as long as land value is 
expected to continue rising. In any event, ordinary households tend to 
buy houses (if they ever buy) in their thirties and forties. For that 
purpose, they have to save. They must have sufficiently large financial 
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savings beforehand due to the relatively high down payments required. 
And, once a house is bought on mortgage, repayment of the principal 
65 
constitutes an important part of household saving. 
Most new houses are built on residential sites newly-converted from 
farm land. When they are sold, a substantial part of the proceeds 
accrues to the sellers of land (primarily farmers in the metropolitan 
suburbs). Due to the continued increases in land prices, they are made 
wealthy. Thus, via this transaction in housing, financial assets are 
transferred from the relatively poor to the relatively rich. The latter 
enjoy more income and wealth. Through this process, w tends to move 
along with w and w as seen in Figure 3. From these observations, one 
can conclude that land prices (relative to the CIP) are a good explana-
tory variable of the personal saving ratio. 
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Why then has W'v (excluding land) continued to rise? Initially in 
the 1950s? as households attempted to recover what they had lost in the 
postwar confusion, w* was set high (in the prevailing standard at that 
time)s and while w was catching up to that level, s continued to rise. 
Once the target was achieved in the early 1960s, s stabilized for a 
while. However, the rapid growth period began and population migration 
intensified. Not only the very young, but also middle-aged farmers began 
to move to the cities in this decade. This mass exodus of the population 
from rural areas is reflected in the resurgence of wu following the 
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mid-1960s. Real income growth gave rise to a strong demand for improved 
housing and residential land prices soared as a consequence. This led to 
another round of saving. Recall that household capital formation ac-
counts for about a half of household gross saving--the two tend to move 
together. Interestingly enough, the collapse of the land speculation 
boom in 1974 is reflected in a similar fall in w . However, the demand 
for wealth soon recovered, and w* returned to its upward path. 
Saving for retirement. Needless to say, the provisions for old age 
are an important component of w . This component involves a timing 
problem. A plausible lifecycle sequence is like this. A working house-
hold first saves for acquisition of housing—possibly in the thirties or 
so. In the meantime, children grow up and paying for their college 
education eats up much of the household income during the late forties 
and early fifties. Finally by their late fifties, the family is free of 
major financial obligations. Sizable separation allowances received at 
the time of mandatory retirement (now more at 60 years of age than 55) 
add to the family nest egg. The worker often moves on to a second 
career. Social security and pension benefits help the family into 
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retirement living. When the lifecycle is complete, the household barely 
breaks even apart form housing ownership. Now that individuals live 
longer, they have to increase their means of support. They must be 
supported either by themselves, by their children, or by their fellow 
citizens. Let us consider these possibilities in turn. 
To achieve self-support, old people must have ample employment 
opportunities. The mandatory retirement age has been rising from the 
traditional 55 to 60 in nearly a half of the firms which enforce mandato-
ry retirement. Still, following mandatory retirement second careers are 
needed for reasonable self-help. As we noted earlier, old workers still 
work in a substantial number in paid jobs. There will be more old people 
looking for jobs. Will there by enough job openings for them? We should 
note that there have been substantial modifications to the seniority 
number in paid jobs. There will be more old people looking for jobs. 
Will there be enough job openings for them? We should note that there 
have been substantial modifications to the seniority (nenko) wage system 
in recent years, as firms are beginning to extend the length of "life-
time" employment. Obviously, senior workers are more expensive than new 
employees, even though their wages are often frozen or even debased when 
they are past the former mandatory age. Firms have coped with this 
development in a number of ways. One is to lower the tilt of the 
age-wage profile so that older people are no longer paid as much as 
before relative to the entry pay. The other is to reduce severance 
68 pay. These changes in wage practices imply that workers have to modify 
the aforementioned lifecycle sequence and reconsider their long-term 
consumption-saving plan. 
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The family system in Japan has been in a state of transition. Even 
though three-generation families remain in dominant mode of family life 
69 in Japan, unlike in America and Europe, the trend toward the nuclear 
family has been proceeding slowly but steadily. Even when parents live 
with their grown children, they are often separate in family budgeting, 
sometimes in separate living quarters under the same roof. Mass-media 
columnists advise the elderly against depending on their children1s 
spontaneous support. 
As the dependency ratio is expected to rise, the working population 
must support an increasingly larger number of retired workers. The 
social security burden on workers will rise to an intolerable level if 
the present benefit level is maintained. A debasement in the benefit 
structure is inevitable if the social security system is to remain 
solvent,, 
Predicting the saving ratio. What can be said about the household 
saving ratio for the future? Under the target wealth hypothesis, the 
saving ratio is subject to long-term influences--the growth rate of 
nominal income and changes in the target wealth-income ratio. In the 
last several years (1979-83), household disposable income increased at an 
average rate of 6 percent per annum (2 per cent in real terms and 4 per 
cent in the consumption deflator). Barring any unforeseen events (such 
as another oil shock), this average growth rate may be expected to 
continue in the foreseeable future. The wealth-income ratio (excluding 
land) was 2.4 in 1983, Thus, if the ratio remains unchanged, the saving 
ratio would be expected to be 14 per cent due to the long-term growth of 
income. An observed saving ratio above this level must be due to a 
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concurrent rise in the target wealth.-income ratio pursued by household in 
general. 
In order to predict the behavior of w* in the future, whether it 
will continue to rise, reach a plateau, or even decline, the individual 
components of w must be considered. As for land value, w , it may be 
noted that the population influx into metropolitan areas has virtually 
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come to an end and the natural increase in the population has also 
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slowed. In view of these developments, the demand for new residential 
sites will not be as strong as previously and urban land prices will rise 
only slowly. Under these circumstances, increases in w will be slower 
than heretofore. In fact, urban residential land prices reached such a 
high level that new housing demand was depressed and w? had been kept at 
a stationary level since 1979. 
Changes in net financial assets, w will be crucial, therefore, in 
influencing changes in the target wealth-income ratio. Over the last ten 
years, w has been on an upward trend, surpassing the European level but 
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still below that of the United States (see Table 3).' Can w be 
expected to continue to rise? Some factors, particularly those related 
to the demographic transition Japanese society is experiencing, are 
important in this regard. Lifecycle needs are anticipated to change as 
people begin to live longer. However, lifecycle factors are 
double-edged, having both positive and negative effects on household 
saving. 
As the population ages, workers must save more for themselves to 
prepare for a longer expected retirement life. They cannot expect as 
much family support as before in view of the continued erosion of the 
traditional family system; and as social security benefits are 
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anticipated to be less generous, they cannot depend as heavily upon 
public support. How much a worker saves depends on how long he expects 
to continue working. The mandatory retirement age has been gradually 
extended from 55 to 60. Employment after the age of 60 in a second 
career depends on future job opportunities for the elderly--which cannot 
be predicted with any certainty. Corresponding to this positive effect 
of increased worker saving, the negative saving of retire workers will 
also increase. The net effect may be an eventual downward pressure on 
the household saving ratio--a view currently gaining in popularity in 
Japan. Another important issue is the tax reform expected to be under-
taken in attempt to balance the national budget. 
IV. Business and Saving and Investment 
In the national accounts, unincorporated businesses are included in 
the household sector. The business sector, therefore, consists of 
corporations (both private and public), which can be further divided into 
financial and nonfinancial enterprises. As certain arbitrary and artifi-
cial adjustments are made on the income-outlay account of financial 
corporations, it is difficult to perform ordinary economic analysis on 
their record. Therefore, the analysis that follows is restricted to the 
nonfinancial business sector. It must be noted that the bulk of this 
analysis concentrates on the period from 1970 on due to the extensive 
data revision of the NIPA making the old and new series not readily 
comparable. 
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A. The Capital-Output Ratio, Capital!s Share, and the Aggregate 
Production Function 
Table 10 present two estimates of the capital-output ratio. The 
first5 for the nonfinancial business sector from 1970 to 1983, is the 
ratio of net fixed capital stock to GDP at factor cost, both in 1975 
prices. The second sector extending further back in time, is the ratio 
of gross fixed capital stock to GDP in purchasers1 value, both in 1975 
prices. As Figure 4 reveals, the two estimates exhibit quite comparable 
movements over the overlapping years, thus allowing us to study the 
movements of the capital-output ratio since the mid-1950s. The ratio 
fell through the late 1950s, stabilized through the 1960s (though with a 
small rise in the first half and a small fall in the second half), rose 
sharply form 1970-1975, and then again stabilized at a higher level. 
Capital!s share is the ratio of gross returns on capital (defined as 
the sum of the consumption of fixed capital and operating surplus) to GDP 
at factor cost. Figure 4 shows that capitalfs share has covaried in-
versely with the capital-output ratio over the last three decades, 
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suggesting the existence of an aggregate production function. 
How can observed changes in the capital-output ratio and capital!s 
share, especially in the first half of the 1970s be explained? The two 
ratios together imply that marginal product of capital (MPK) was consid-
erably different in the years prior to 1970 than those after 1975. The 
MPK was higher before 1970, because firms attempted to economize on 
capital, which was in short supply. 
In Japan, households1 financial savings have been placed principally 
in bank deposits, postal savings, and life insurance policies. Financial 
institutions which served as depositories of personal savings made loans 
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to borrowers--principally business firms. The government adopted a 
low-interest rate policy immediately after World War II and placed 
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ceilings on loan rates. Thus, when an unusually strong demand for 
investment funds emerged in the 1960s, the demand for funds exceeded the 
supply of funds at the given maximum loan rate, and financial institu-
tions engaged in credit rationing. As funds were available in an 
amount less than desired, firms tried to keep their capital-output ratio 
low. The other side of this story is that the rate of return on capital 
was higher than the cost of capital. 
The economy's growth rate began to decline in 1970. Hence, the 
demand for investment started to fall. The supply of saving, however, 
continued to rise. In the funds market, excess demand disappeared. With 
more funds available, firms could now raise their capital-output ratio. 
At the same time, industry faced an acute labor shortage, especially for 
new workers, as the agricultural labor force which had been its major 
source of new labor supply was nearly depleted. The labor shortage 
induced firms to substitute capital for labor, thereby tending to raise 
the capital-output ratio. The fact that this rise had already begun in 
1970 and was completed by 1975 suggests that it was not the oil shock, as 
popularly believed, that led to this increase in capital intensity. 
B. Business Investment 
While the capital-output ratio was rising through the early 1970s, 
the capital formation proportion was maintained at a higher level than 
would have been otherwise. To see this point, consider the following 
identity: 
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where I is gross fixed capital formation, K is net fixed capital stock, 
and 6 the depreciation ratio. The identity shows that the amount of 
total output devoted to capital formation depends on (l) a change in the 
capital-output ratio, (2) the growth rate, and (3) the depreciation 
ratio, given the capital-output ratio. During the early 1970s, the 
positive change in K/Y averaged 8 percentage points per year. When fixed 
investment is maintained at a high level, the growth rate is sustained 
via its multiplier effect, even though the potential growth rate has been 
lowered. A high growth rate, in turn, generates investment demand via 
its accelerator effect. 
The capital-output ratio cannot continue rising indefinitely. The 
marginal product of capital begins to decline. When it declines to a 
sufficiently low level consistent with the prevailing cost of funds, the 
capital-output ratio reaches a plateau, as occurred in 1975. Both the 
multiplier and accelerator effects cease to function. The growth rate is 
now constrained to the potential growth rate. I/Y now stabilizes at a 
lower level, although the higher capital-output ratio helps to make I/Y a 
little higher than might otherwise occur. Table 11 compares quinquennial 
average values of I/Y for the nonfinancial corporate sector and the 
entire economy. For the latter, it is seen that business investment 
continued to claim a constant share in 1970-74 for the 1960s, despite a 
fall in the growth rate. Since 1975, both the growth rate and the 
capital formation proportion have declined to lower levels. 
C. Business Profits and Savings 
The rise in the capital-output ratio has brought about drastic 
changes in corporate income statements. First of all, capitalfs share 
decreased. Table 12 traces the changes in gross operating surplus by 
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component between 1970-74 and 1975-83). Capital's share of GDP at factor 
cost declined by nearly 9 percent points from 43.8 to 35.0 per cent. At 
the same time, consumption of fixed capital fell by 3 percentage points 
despite the fact that the capital-output ratio rose. This is because of 
a substantial fall in the depreciation ratio (from 12.1 per cent to 8.5 
0 A 
per cent). Also, direct taxes maintained a stable fraction, despite 
the fact that taxable corporate income (as a percent of GDP) fell, due to 
the continued rise of the corporate tax rate. As Japanese firms borrow 
heavily, they pay a sizable sum in interest and rental payments. As 
interest rates remained stable through the period under study (except 
during the oil shock years), firms' net property income paid claimed a 
stable proportion of corporate GDP. When all these items (and an addi-
tional entry for miscellaneous items) are subtracted from capital's 
share, we arrive at net profits. Net profits declined from 8.9 per cent. 
This decline understates the actual fall in profitability, as net profits 
were falling rapidly through the early 1970s. Table 10 shows that 
capital's share fell from 46.8 per cent in 1960-69 to 43.3 per cent in 
1970-74 in the secondary sector. Thus, the fall in the share of net 
profits must have been form a little over 12 per cent in the 1960s to 3 
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per cent in 1975-83. 
Net profits (NP) are divided between dividends and corporate saving 
(CS). Dividends not only comprised a relatively small fraction of GDP 
due to the relative unimportance of equity financing but also changed 
relatively little over the years. This means that corporate saving took 
the full brunt of the fall in net profits (see Table 13). Movements in 
corporate saving may be explained by net profits and net worth (NW). 
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After adjusting for time lags, the following relation is derived: 
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CS/GDP = .813 NP/GDP - .034 NW/GDP + .068 
This equation shows that a decrease in corporate profits leads to a 
reduction in corporate saving, almost yen for yen, and that an increase 
in net worth also gives rise to a fall in saving because of an increase 
in dividend payments. Corporate saving claimed as much as 12 per cent of 
corporate GDP in 1970 but fell to less than 1 per cent on average over 
the last decade. As the depression of profits has been persistent, the 
low level of corporate saving is also a chronic phenomenon. 
D. Rates of Return 
It is useful to compute realized rates of return in order to show 
how depressed business profits have been. For this exercise, the struc-
ture of corporate finance becomes important. Total assets are equal to 
the sum of its liabilities and its net worth. A firm does not employ all 
of its assets in its operation, but lends some on the outside, corre-
sponding to the nonmonetary financial assets which the firm holds. The 
firmfs balance sheet is thus represented by: total assets less 
nonmonetary financial assets (1A) = worth (2A) + liabilities (3A) -
nonmonetary financial assets (4A). Correspondingly its income statement 
would be: operating surplus after tax (IB) = net profits (2B) + interest 
and rentals paid (3B) - property income received (4B). 
Let us define four rates as follows: r = 1B/1A = after tax rate of 
return on total assets less nonmonetary financial assets, r~ = 2B/2A = 
after-tax rate of return on net worth, i, = 3B/3A = implicit rate of 
interest on liabilities and i = 4B/4A = implicit rate of interest on 
nonmonetary financial assets. r is the rate of return which is most 
closely related to the marginal product of capital in our production 
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function analysis except that monetary assets, inventories, and land are 
included. It is not r , but r , which is the rate of return on net worth 
after adjusting for payments and receipts of interest, that is compared 
with the net cost of funds. This adjustment is of particular importance 
in the case of Japanese firms because property income paid and received 
is a sizeable wedge between r and r 
To be clear on these points, consult the following identity: 
r-(NW + D - A) = r0N¥ + i.D - iAA 1 2 d A 
where NW is net worth, D liabilities, and A nonmonetary financial assets. 
As shown in Table 14, both i- and i remained stable in the period 
9
 d a r 
under study. i, has been around 6 per cent, slightly lower than the 
average bank loan rate. i in contrast has been about one half of i n 
° a d5 
presumably reflecting the fact that interest rates charged on interfirm 
trade credit (about 2/3 of nonmonetary financial assets) have been kept 
below the market rate as a disguised subsidy to subcontractors. 
Recall that the capital-output ratio rose and capital!s share fell 
from the 1960s to the late 1970s. In that process, the marginal product 
of capital declined nearly by half (see Table 10). This fall is reflect-
ed in the fall of r , which also fell by one half (r was 8.6 per cent in 
1970). As i, and i were stable during this period, the fall in r. was 
d a 1 
more than f u l l y t r a n s m i t t e d to a f a l l in r ? . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t 
more c l e a r l y , cons ider the fol lowing i d e n t i t y : 
r0 = r- + (r- - ijD/NW - ( r - i )A/NW Z I 1 u l a 
which is derived form the identity given earlier. Both (r - i.) and 
(r - i ) fell, but as D/NW was in excess of A/NW, the fall in r0 was 
l a z 
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greater than the fall in r . In 1970, r and r^  were nearly equal at 8,6 
and 8.0 per cent, respectively. r^  probably exceeded r in the 1960s. 
The severity of the profit squeeze became obvious when r9 fell from about 
10 per cent in the 1960s to a little over 1 per cent in recent years. 
E. The Corporate Financial Structure 
It is important to note that the above analysis is based on the NIPA 
which makes full adjustment to capital-asset valuation. Corporate 
balance sheets differ substantially from the originals as reported by 
corporations and the reconstructed one as given in the NIPA, principally 
because of the significant undervaluation of physical assets, especially 
land5 which are recorded at original acquisition cost in corporations * 
financial records. The undervaluation is far more magnified in net worth 
that in total assets. This means that the realized rates of return 
recorded in the annual financial reports of corporations are 
* + A 8 8 
overstated. 
A direct corollary is that debt is overstated in book values. The 
debt-asset ratio is as high as 85 per cent in Japan while it is in the 
neighborhood of 55 per cent in the United States. When assets are 
properly revalued, the ratio falls to around 45 per cent in both coun-
tries (see Table 15). Thus, in terms of stock, the composition of total 
assets is not much different today between Japanese and American 
S9 
corporations. 
This does not mean that Japanese firms have ceased to depend as 
heavily on debt financing. Table 16 analyzes new flows of business funds 
by source. Internal sources have become slightly more important in the 
early 1980s, but when depreciation charges are netted out, external 
sources have actually gained in importance due to the diminished role of 
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retained profits. Financial institutions account for 90 per cent of 
external financing sources--a proportion which has not varied since the 
late 1960s. 
That Japanese corporations have earned much less than American 
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corporations in recent years has been often noted. Such comparisons 
are in book values. When proper valuation adjustments are fully applied, 
the U.S.-Japan profit disparity is likely to be far greater. In fact, 
Japanese rates of return (r ) have been negative. How can such low rates 
of return be compatible with a viable business environment? How can 
capital formation be maintained even at the present level? 
The reason gross capital formation has remained at a stable fraction 
of GDP since the mid-1970s under such adverse conditions may be sought in 
the fact that sizable capital gains were accruing to the firms1 real 
assets, namely, inventory, fixed capital, and land. From 1975 to 1983, 
their price deflators increased at the annual average rates of 3,0, 3,3, 
and 11.5 per cent per cent per annum. When weighted (0.1:0.5:0.4), the 
average price increase was 6.6 per cent annum. As the ratio of real 
assets to net worth stands at 1.1, capital gains amounts to 7.2 per cent 
of net worth. It must be noted that this high rate of capital gain is 
due primarily to land. 
In passing, let me comment on the role of the user cost of funds in 
business investment decisions. According to neoclassical theory of 
91 investment, the marginal product of capital is equated to the user 
cost of funds. The user cost of funds consists of depreciation charges 
of fixed assets, corporate profit taxes, financial cost of borrowed 
funds, and adequate returns on invested funds. What may be considered as 
an adequate rate of return on net worth is the real interest rate 
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(nominal interest rate - capital gains accruing to net worth). Thus, the 
user cost of funds depends, among other things, on the depreciation 
ratio, the corporate income tax rate, the loan interest rate, and the 
rate of real asset appreciation. As interest cost (as well as deprecia-
tion cost) is nontaxable, the unit user cost is less sensitive to the tax 
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rate, the more heavily firms depend on borrowed funds. In the case of 
Japanese firms, we note that the corporate tax rate edged upward but the 
interest rate remained stable; firms still depend heavily on borrowed 
funds, the depreciation ratio fell but in truth has been stationary. 
Components of the user cost attributable to these elements have therefore 
been more or less stable since the 1970s through the early 1980s. The 
only volatile element was capital gains. The rate of inflation (in the 
implicit GNP deflator) was 5.1 per cent in 1965-69, 8.4 per cent in 
1970-74, 4.7 per cent in 1975-79, and 1.1 per cent in 1980-84. It 
follows that the user cost was sizeable in the 1960s but fell sharply 
toward zero in the early 1970s, and then again rose to a high level in 
the early 1980s. The sharp increase in the capital-output ratio in the 
early 1970s must have owed a great deal to this temporary fall in the 
user cost at that time. 
F. The Saving-Investment Balance in the Business Sector 
In summary, the capital-output ratio rose and capitalfs share fell 
in the nonfinancial corporate sector during the early 1970s. As profits 
were squeezed, corporate saving fell sharply. However, the decline in 
the growth rate resulted in an even sharper fall in the capital formation 
proportion, despite the rise in the capital-output ratio. Hence, the 
sector's need for external funds was sharply diminished in the late 
1970s. 
-44-
These findings also hold for the business sector as a whole when 
financial institutions are considered. Since financial institutions 
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receive more income than they pay out, they are a source of funds. 
Thus, in the business sector, the excess of investment over saving is 
further reduced, though the sector remains a net borrower. Table 17 
shows the saving-investment balance in the business sector over the last 
two decades. The sector1s net borrowing fell from 9 per cent of the 
economy's GDP in the early 1970s to 5 per cent since 1975. 
In view of the stability of those proportions reported in Table 17, 
it seems that the business sector has been in a steady state at a low 
level of economic growth since the mid-1970s. As shown, both corporate 
saving and investment are related to the sector1s aggregate production 
function. Hence, unless there is a drastic change in the latter, one 
cannot anticipate much further change in these proportions. Changes in 
the production function relate to the rate and bias of technical change. 
The center of gravity in the Japanese economy has been moving steadily 
toward the tertiary sector and away from the secondary sector. This 
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so-called Service Revolution has two implications. First, the rate of 
productivity growth with be further slowed because, traditionally, 
productivity growth has been much more limited in the tertiary sector 
than in the primary and secondary sectors. Second, the bias of technical 
change may also be affected by this shift in the industrial structure 
because the capital-output ratio varies considerably from industry to 
industry. A statistical examination reveals that the tertiary sector is 
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much less capital-intensive. Hence, ceteris paribus, the aggregate 
capital-output ratio may fall as the tertiary industries become a larger 
contributor to the economy?s GDP. Developments which may offset this 
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tendency are office automation^ quality upgrading in service facilities, 
and the like. However, these may not be enough to maintain the aggregate 
capital-output ratio at its present level* 
V. The Macroeconomic Balance 
In order to complete our discussion of saving and investment in the 
Japanese economy, the saving and investment behavior of the government 
and the external sector must be discussed. For the economy as a whole, 
saving and investment are identically equal. This is not so at the 
various sector levels. For the domestic sectors, we have the following 
identity for each sector: 
Saving (S) + consumption of fixed capital (CFG) 
= Gross capital formation (GCF) + net lending (NL) + adjusting 
96 items. 
For the external sector, the corresponding identity is 
Receipt on current account (X) - payments on current account (M) 
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= Net lending (NL) + adjusting items. 
The investment™saving identity for the economy as a whole can be restated 
as an identity of net lendings in the domestic economy as a whole and the 
external sector. (The same is true of adjusting items.) See Table 18. 
A. The Macroeconomic Balance 
Prior to the mid-1970s, the household sector was a net lender and 
the business sector a net borrower of funds. The demand for and the 
supply of funds were near equilibrium between these two sectors consti-
tuting the private economy. This fact may be a primary factor in Japan1s 
rapid growth. Indeed, saving was growing faster ex ante than investment 
a indicated by the gradual easing of credit rationing. I have argued 
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that this longitudinal behavior of household saving is an outcome of 
industrialization-cum-urbanization. The process of economic growth 
itself generated private saving in an amount sufficient to support the 
capital formation required to maintain that growth, as it did through the 
1960s up to 1973 in Japan. Capital shortage, therefore, was not a 
constraint upon growth. 
Operating under the balanced budget principle and favored by rapidly 
growing tax revenue, the general government maintained a small budget 
surplus. As the private economy balanced saving and investment, the 
government's budget surplus matched a surplus in the current account of 
the balance of payments. By the mid-1970s, this was no longer the case. 
As economic growth slowed down, business investment fell sharply, and 
even though business saving fell the business sector's net borrowing 
diminished greatly. In the household sector, the saving ratio started to 
decrease, primarily in capital formation. Hence, the household sector 
remained as much of a net lender as before, and saving came to exceed 
investment in the private economy. Thus, Japan encountered a critical 
turning point—from a neoclassical economy in which saving overwhelmed 
investment to a Keynesian economy in which investment conditions saving. 
In the latter, an ex ante excess saving would be eliminated by reduction 
of aggregate supply and emergence of large-scale involuntary unemploy-
ment. If such unemployment is to be averted, the government must either 
engage in deficit spending or capital must flow to overseas investments, 
thereby enabling the private economy to maintain its excess saving. In 
the late 1970s, the former solution seems to have been followed; in the 
early 1980s, the latter situation seems to have also developed. Let us 
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now turn to an examination of these developments. 
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B. The Government Sector 
Although one effect of government deficits was to sop up excess 
saving in the private sector, this development was more a coincidence of 
circumstance than an outcome of deliberate stabilization policy. The 
emergence of government deficits was inevitable due to structural prob-
lems under slowed growth. 
Table 19 outlines the increase in government deficits by components. 
First, there has been a strong upward pressure on the governments 
purchase of goods and services in both consumption and investment. 
Second, the economic activities of the government are often very 
labor-intensive, and a large part of its expenditure goes to this wage 
bill. Even thought the Japanese government maintained a relatively small 
public administration, its work force increased at a somewhat faster rate 
than the total labor force. At the same time, the wage scale of civil 
service jobs, especially those of local governments (accounting for 70 
percent of total government employment), continued to improve at a faster 
rate than the wage scale of the private sector (before the recent pay 
freezes of national civil services). This relative expansion of the 
government's labor cost partially accounts for the increase in government 
expenditures. 
Third, transfers have been increasing even more markedly. Over the 
period under study, transfer payments rose by nearly six percentage 
points. In this regard, there are two notable features: the balance of 
the social security system has turned adverse, and interest cost has been 
rising at a rapid rate, due to the sharp expansion of outstanding public 
debt since the late 1970s. 
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Revenues did not keep pace with disbursements. Disbursements 
increased by nearly 11 per cent while revenues increased by only 6 per 
cent. Nearly half of the revenues collected were from direct taxes on 
households. This increase was achieved by maintaining the personal 
income tax schedule at its 1974 level for subsequence years. Previously, 
personal income tax cuts were enacted annually as rapid income growth 
increased tax revenue. As inflation and real growth pushed nominal 
income upward, individuals moved up into their higher income tax brackets 
and more low-income workers began to pay taxes. At the same time, social 
security contributions increased by 4 per cent. The sum total was that 
household disposable income virtually stopped growing in real terms. 
Large deficits were financed by new bond issues and the outstanding 
balance of national debt grew to an alarming proportion--46 per cent of 
GDP in March 1983, a level even exceeding the present level of the U.S. 
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national debt. With the bond yield above 7 per cent (as of 1984), debt 
servicing alone claims nearly 3 per cent of GDP. If the present level of 
government deficits continues, the debt-income ratio is likely to rise 
further. Thus, while government deficits helped the Japanese economy 
to escape the Scylla of extensive unemployment, the government has been 
faced with the Charybdis of bankruptcy. Fiscal reform has been and will 
remain an important issue on the public agenda. 
C. The External Sector 
An economy faced with excess domestic saving can also dispose of its 
surplus capital by overseas export. By becoming a major capital export-
er, Japan can solve its internal imbalance and benefit the capital-short 
world economy. 
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Japan1s overseas lending has added up to only slightly above 1 per 
cent of GDP over the last two decades after accounting for year-to-year 
fluctuations (see Table 18). This means that by and large, Japan1s 
excess saving in the private economy has been absorbed by its fiscal 
deficits. In the early 1980s, however, the current account of the 
balance of payments began to show an increasing surplus. This surplus in 
the current account was as high as 3.0 per cent of GDP in 1984 and may 
surpass this record in 1985 (see Table 20). 
Interpreting this recent development as an indication of a new 
long-term trend, government economists in Japan marshalled the following 
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argument in the summer of 1984. Under decelerated growth in Japan, 
rates of return on domestic investments declined and incentives to invest 
at home have weakened considerably. Owners of capital which is in excess 
supply look for better investment opportunities abroad resulting in 
capital exports. Deficits which then appear in the capital account are 
matched by surpluses in the current account due to the trend in Japan 
toward a chronic export surplus in merchandise trade. This tendency can 
be attributed to the high income elasticity of about 2 for exports with 
respect to foreign income and a low income elasticity of about 2/3 for 
103 imports with respect to domestic income. 
There are at least two major questions that must be addressed with 
respect to this argument. The first is concerned with whether or not the 
recent rise in the trade balance is of a short-run nature. The second is 
whether the balance of payments position is determined principally by 
internal forces or external forces. 
Japan's trade balance, which dominates the current-account balance, 
has fluctuated widely over the last two decades. During the two oil 
-50-
shocks (1973-74 and 1979-80), Japan1s trade balance turned adverse as its 
import bill rose sharply. Exports then caught up as the terms of trade 
became more favorable for manufactured goods. This sequence has been 
repeated twice since the mid-1970s. Thus, Japan's trade balance has 
proved to be more sensitive to imports than to exports in its 
year-to-year fluctuations. Therefore, external shocks play an important 
role in influencing Japan's current-account position. 
Such an external shock ought to result in a substantial shift in the 
exchange rate under the flexible exchange rate regime, if the current 
account is to be balanced swiftly. This did not occur in Japan. The 
reason behind the relative stability of the exchange rate in the short 
run was that the capital account was accommodating to the current ac-
count. When a deficit appears in the current account, it tends to be 
temporarily absorbed by a reduction in the monetary authorities' official. 
and/or an increase in the country's foreign liabilities. The opposite 
occurs when a surplus emerges in the current account. 
Capital flows, however, are not merely accommodating to the current 
account. Capital flows, especially capital outflows, are sensitive to 
international interest differentials, especially with respect to the 
United States. When U.S. interest rates were internationally high in the 
early 1980s, capital flowed to the United States causing an increase in 
the price of dollars. The cheaper yen then stimulated Japanese exports, 
especially to the United States. Again, this development is due to an 
external shock. 
Hence, external shocks—whether via the current account or the 
capital account—are factors which greatly influence Japan's balance of 
payments position. Therefore, the recent increases in Japan's current-
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account surplus can be largely accounted for by external shocks. In 
addition, Japan's trade balance is largely dependent on the worldfs 
terms of trade. 
Contrary to what Japan's government economists maintain, there would 
be no tendency for a surplus in the trade balance, if the terms of trade 
remain at a level which initially equates exports and imports in Japan* 
First of all, the income elasticity of imports is closer to unity than 
the 2/3 espoused by the government economists according to almost all 
available econometric estimates. Second, as Japan's export prices tend 
to fall relative to the domestic price level due to the more rapid 
productivity growth in the export sector, reducing the export growth rate 
will be less in nominal terms than in real terms. Moreover, if Japan's 
domestic growth rate should fall toward the world's growth rate, its 
export growth would decline as the rate of export expansion would depend 
on the growth of the domestic supply capacity. 
Altogether, Japan's balance of payments position has been and will 
be more strongly influenced by external forces than by internal forces. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that internal forces are strong enough 
104 to push excess domestic saving into capital outflows. The resulting 
deficit in the capital account must be matched by a surplus of equal 
magnitude in the current account. Japan is currently the leading indus-
trial exporter and tends to concentrate its export to a few major desti-
nations (e.g., the United States, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East) 
and on a few major commodities (automobiles, steel, electronics, and 
increasingly high-tech products). It will become increasingly difficult 
for Japan to expand its international market share as protectionist 
sentiments rise in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Under such 
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circumstances, Japanfs excess saving will remain locked within the 
country, 
This does not mean, however, that internal forces have been wholly 
without effect. On the contrary, such forces have expressed themselves 
in the form of export drives—another cause of recurrent trade friction. 
Whenever Japan1s domestic demand weakens, Japanese exporters attempt to 
sell their goods overseas. External demand is forced to increase, 
thereby helping the country to moderate the intensity of recession. This 
development has led to foreign criticism of Japan1s short-term macroeco-
nomic policy, as seen in the spring of 1985. This phenomenon, however, 
is of a short-term nature. The export drive also works in reverse. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
A. The Future Scenario 
Having reviewed saving and investment in Japan, I now turn to a 
discussion of what the macroeconomic balance may look like in the near 
future, 
(1) The growth rate is not likely to rise above the 4 per cent 
level. Economic activities will continue to gravitate toward the tertia-
ry sector where productivity growth has been relatively slow. Unless 
sudden improvement in efficiency can be anticipated in this sector, the 
future growth rate will not exceed the historical trend. 
(2) Accepting low growth and high capital costs, business 
investment will at best remain at the level observed in the last several 
years. If there is no marked change in technology, the capital-output 
ratio will decline overall as the tertiary sector continues to gain in 
importance within the national economy. 
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(3) As for household savings the future trend is more diffi-
cult to predict. An important factor is expected changes in the target 
wealth-income ratio for the future. As population migration into the 
metropolitan areas is completed and population growth slows, the land-GDP 
ratio is current value may finally be stabilized. Its effect on the 
housing and financial asset-income ratios may be stationary. As social 
security benefits are expected to decline and employment opportunities 
for the elderly to remain poor, the incentive to save will remain strong 
for working households. At the same time, dissaving by retired workers 
will increase as their proportion will rise in the total population. It 
seems plausible to predict that the household saving ratio will gradually 
fall. It is not clear, however, how far this overall reduction in saving 
ratio will lead to a fall in households1 net lending or how soon it will. 
be realized. 
(4) While excess private saving continues, it will be diffi-
cult for the government to balance the budget unless it is willing to 
jeopardize the maintenance of reasonably full employment. If the govern-
ment must continue its deficit spending, public debt will increase at a 
considerable rate. If the public becomes reluctant to absorb this 
ever-increasing public debt, the interest rate will rise. The government 
will have to pay more for debt services and therefore will be forced to 
enlarge its deficits further--a vicious circle. 
Increased government revenues may reduce future deficits. Such 
a solution would entail an overhaul of the present tax system, as piece-
meal changes would not be sufficient. Should the government rely more on 
indirect taxes, despite lukewarm public response on this issue? Should 
it increase the personal income rates or raise corporate income taxes, 
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already very high? Or should the government discontinue the small-saver 
tax-exemption program, on which no consensus has yet been reached. 
Concrete measures are still in the formative stage despite a great deal 
of rhetoric in public debate. 
It is difficult to reduce government expenditures in the face 
of rising economic and social needs, despite the efforts of administra-
tive reform. One example is the social security which is threatened by 
structural imbalance unless some fundamental changes are adopted. 
(5) A portion of private saving may be exported as capital 
outflows. By engaging capital export in full scale Japan can mitigate 
its chronic domestic macroeconomic imbalance. However, this solution is 
a difficult one as capital exports must be matched by a surplus in the 
current account. A large surplus in the trade balance has emerged since 
the early 1980s, because of the decline in the prices of oil and other 
primary goods which lower Japan1s import bill relative to domestic output 
and because of the high interest rates prevailing in the United States 
attracting overseas capital to finance its huge fiscal deficits. The 
high price of the dollar has encouraged Japanese exports to the Untied 
States. Japan has become the number one industrial exporter, overtaking 
Germany and the United States in 1984. As evidenced in the emergence of 
intense economic conflicts between Japan and the rest of the world, there 
will be stronger resistance to further expansion of Japanese experts. As 
Japan1s comparative advantage has been moving into technology-intensive 
goods, especially in the high-tech field, Japanese exporters must make 
significant inroads into foreign markets. Such an intensive effort has 
already given rise to trade frictions. 
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Furthermore, foreign pressure is getting stronger for increased 
imports of manufactured goods into Japan, which have been low by interna-
tional comparison. If imports into Japan are to be increased, there must 
be a corresponding increase in exports out of Japan (or increased imports 
of fabricated products matched by a decline in imports of crude materi-
als) . Both are difficult to achieve on a short-term basis. 
It is evident that maintenance of the macroeconomic balance at full 
employment will remain a very serious challenge to Japanese policymakers 
in the foreseeable future. There has been no dearth of proposals on how 
to meet this challenge. Methods by which to stimulate "vitality in 
the private sector" have been actively debated. It is argued that 
administrative measures taken in this direction will stimulate private 
economic incentives. Some indirect measures which have already been 
initiated are deregulation on the cumbersome government controls in many 
economic spheres and denationalization of public enterprises dominated by 
inefficient government monopolies in order to introduce competitive 
forces. Other more direct measures may include increasing the scope of 
public investment. It is believed that such a measure would stimulate 
domestic demand, and thereby reduce Japan1s dependence on export expan-
sion for support of its economic growth. However, this would entail 
further expansion of fiscal deficits. Good intentions notwithstanding, 
it is doubtful that these measures can be effective in stimulating 
economic growth, if potential growth remains as subdued as in the last 
decade. 
B. Epilogue 
This chapter has examined the behavior of saving and investment in 
Japan. During the rapid growth period, the private sector met the rising 
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demand for investment with its own saving. In the decelerated growth 
period^ private investment fell more than private saving. The resulting 
surplus of saving was absorbed first be government deficits and later 
also by current-account surpluses. With economic growth anticipated to 
remain at a modes level and the population aging rapidly, the macroeco-
nomic imbalance in the private sector may persist for some time to come. 
Will the government succeed in balancing the budget without jeopar-
dizing the macroeconomic equilibrium through tax reform? Can Japan 
continue to be a capital exporter, despite strong protectionist senti-
ments abroad? These are some of the important questions faced by the 
Japanese economy. It will not be easy to devise satisfactory solutions. 
This is the crossroads at which the Japanese economy now finds itself. 
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Notes 
Before World War II, it appears that macroeconomic equilibrium was 
established via flexible price levels in Japan. See Kazuo Sato, 
f!Senkanki nihon no makuro keizai kikoH (The macroeconomic mechanism in 
prewar Japan), Keizai Kenkyu, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July 1981), pp. 193-201. 
After World War II, the same degree of price flexibility was not observed 
except in the inflation of the immediate postwar period (1945-51) and 
that following the first oil shock (1974-75). 
2 
The capital-output ratio is found by dividing net domestic 
investment (gross domestic investment - fixed capital consumption) by the 
growth rate of real GNP (see Table 1). 
3 Such arguments are common in the media today. For a critical 
review of this issue, see Nathan Glazer, "Social and Cultural Factors in 
Japanese Economic Growth,!! in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, eds., 
Asiafs New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 813-96, particularly pp. 856-59. 
4 The ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP for the period of 
1980-83 was 46.3 per cent in Singapore (with an average annual growth 
rate of real GDP from 1973 to 1983 of 7.8 per cent), 28.2 per cent in 
Korea (7.4 per cent), 27.8 per cent in Taiwan (7.3 per cent) and 24.6 per 
cent in Thailand (6.6 per cent). (IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1984); for Taiwan, 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Statistical 
Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1984 (Taipei, 1984). As for household 
saving (as a per cent of household disposable income) in the period of 
1979-81, we find that among the OECD countries, Portugal (27/7 per cent) 
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and Italy (20.9 per cent) exhibited even higher saving ratios than Japan 
(19.0 per cent). (OECD. National Accounts.) 
5 Capital-stock estimates are sensitive to depreciation ratios which 
must be assumed for their computation. The depreciation ratio of produc-
er capital (obtained by dividing consumption of fixed capital by capital 
stock), implicit in the estimates underlying Table 2, does not seem to 
differ markedly among these countries. In 1980, the ratio with respect 
to private industrial capital stock was 8.3 per cent in Japan, as against 
5.5 per cent in Canada, 8.9 per cent in the United States, 8.4 per cent 
in France, 6.0 per cent in Norway, and 5.3 per cent in the United 
Kingdom. 
For an international comparison of housing conditions, see the 
Chapter by Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba in this volume. 
The depreciation ratio implicit in the housing stock estimate is 
7.3 per cent for Japan, as against 2.5 per cent for the United States, 
1.5 per cent for Norway, and 1.4 per cent for the United Kingdom. Hence, 
Japan1s low level of housing stock is due in part to its lower durabili-
ty. This difference does not seem to be of statistical artifact. In 
terms of the double-declining-balance method, the depreciation ratio 
implies that the average lifetime of housing in Japan is 30 years, 
against 80 years in the United States and some 150 years in Europe. 
Japanese tax law allows for an economic life of 26 years for wooden 
buildings and 65 years for reinforced concrete buildings. Even though 
Japanese houses have improved substantially from the stage of wood and 
paper, they are still not as durable as American and European housing 
built of stones, steel, and concrete. According to Ministry of Construc-
tion statistics, the proportion (in floor space) of wooden houses in all 
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housing starts was 82 per cent in 1955; 61 per cent, 1960; 41 per cent, 
1970; 47 per cent, 1975; 41 per cent, 1980; and 36 per cent, 1984. (Toyo 
Keizai, Keizai tokei nenkan, various issues.) 
8 72 per cent of Japan1s total national land is mountainous. Thus, 
inhabitable land makes up less than one-third of the total land area. In 
Europe the proportion is closer to 60 per cent. 
9 According to the Japan Real Estate Research Institute, the cost of 
2 
residential land per m in 1976 was: $118 (Japan), $19 (Germany), $13 
(United States), and $8 (United Kingdom). Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry, 80-nendai no tsusan seisaku bijon (Visions of indus-
trial policy in the 1980s)(Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 
306. 
Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that life insurance Is much 
more popular in Japan. As of 1983, the average face value of the life 
insurance held by an individual was the highest, in Japan at ¥ 6.2 mil-
lion, followed by the United States at ¥ 5.0 million. Yomiuri Shimbun, 
July 13, 1985. 
Japanese household debt is comprised mainly of housing loans which 
accounted for 93 per cent of total household debt in 1984, according to 
the Family Saving Survey. 
12 
Another important feature to consider is the distribution of 
income. The conventional wisdom, employing such inequality measures as 
the Gini coefficient, maintains that Japan1s income distribution is at 
least as equal as other advanced countries. Ishizaki, however, asserts 
that Japan is more unequal than all other OECD countries except for the 
United States. See Tadao Ishizaki, Nihon no shotoku to tomi no bumpai 
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(The distributions of income and wealth in Japan)(Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 
1983). 
13 
According to national accounting statistics, in the early 1980s, 
the government's health expenditure in Japan was less than 0.4 per cent 
of GDP, as against 6 per cent in Germany, 4 per cent in both Italy and 
the United Kingdom, and 1 per cent in the United States. This, however, 
is due to the fact that health insurance premiums paid by the private 
sector are treated as part of private income and consumption. In 1980, 
Japan1s medical and health expenditure was 5.1 per cent of GDP, of which 
the component publicly paid was 0.6 per cent, insurance-paid, 3.9 per 
cent; and privately-paid, 0.6 per cent. Deliberation Council on the 
Social Security System, Shakai hosho tokei nempo (Social security statis-
tical yearbook) as quoted in Toyo Keizai, Keizai Tokei neukan, 1981. 
14 
The effective interest rate adjusted for the compensating balances 
required by lending institutions in somewhat higher than the normal 
interest rate. See Masahiko Aoki, "Shareholders1 Non-Unanimity on 
Investment Financing: Banks vs. Individual Investors,ff in Masahiko Aoki, 
ed., The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1984), pp. 193-224; and Yasuhiro Wakita, ffWagakuni no 
kashidashi shijo to keiyaku tornihiki" (The loan market and contractual 
transactions in Japan), Kinfyu Kenkyu, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 
47-76. However, since the compensating balance has been about 10-20 per 
cent of total loans, the difference does not seem substantial. Akiyoshi 
Horiuchi, "Economic Growth and Financial Allocation in Postwar Japan," 




For the combination of the short-term interest rate (i) and the 
CPI inflation rate (n), the regression equation is: 
i = l.OOn + 4.4%, R2 = .953 
(.10) (.8) 
Thus, the Fisher theorem holds in this cross-country sample. Deviations 
from the regression line are Japan (0.2 per cent), the United States (1.5 
per cent), Canada (-0.1 per cent), and the United Kingdom (0 per cent). 
According to the Japan Federation of Employers Organization 
(Keidanren), the effective corporate tax rate in Japan was 51.6 per cent 
(1984); Germany, 49.8 per cent (1984); France, 45.7 per cent (1980); 
United States, 32.3 per cent (1985); and United Kingdom, 18.1 per cent 
(1982). Yomiuri Shimbun. August 17, 1984. 
For changes in the corporate tax rate over time, see Seiritsu 
Ogura and Naoyuki Yoshino, !!Zeisei to zaisei toyushif! (The tax system and 
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program), in Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro 
Okuno, and Kotaro Suzumura, eds., Nihon no sangyo seisaku (Industrial 
policy of Japan)(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), pp. 105-31. 
These are the projected figures of the Population Research 
Committee, "Nihon no shorai suikei jinko" (Estimates of future population 
in Japan), as quoted in Toyo Keizai, Keizai tokei nenkan, 1985. 
1 8 
The labor force participation ratio of male workers, 65 and older, 
was 57.1 per cent in I960, 47.7 per cent in 1970, 41.0 per cent in 1980, 
and 38.9 per cent in 1983. Ministry of Labor, Labor Statis-
tics Yearbook, various issues. 
19 
See Noguchi's paper in this volume for a discussion of why the 
system must be changed. In short, the system was designed such that 
individuals would receive benefits far in excess of their lifetime 
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contributions. To keep the benefit ratio for a greater proportion of 
beneficiaries in the population, the contribution ratio has to be raised 
very much. As a first step toward reducing the imbalance of the social 
security system, the law was revised in April 1985 so as to modify the 
benefit calculation formula over the next 20 years with the view to 
keeping benefits at the present level while avoiding anticipated exces-
sive rises in the contribution ratio to some extent. 
20 
The Statistics Bureau of the Office of the Prime Minister (since 
1984, the Management and Coordination Agency) has conducted a monthly 
survey of urban family budget, Kakei Chosa (Family Income Expenditure 
Survey, FIES), since 1951 with a sample size of about 8,000 household. 
Household financial assets and liabilities are covered in an annual 
survey by the same agency, Chochiku Doko Chosa (Family Saving Survey), 
with a sample size of about 6,000 households, a half of which overlap 
with the FIES sample. A quinquennial survey, Zenkoku Shohi Jittai Chosa 
(National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure), began in 1959 and 
covers the three months from September to November each year, has a 
larger sample of about 46,000 households (1974) including single-person 
households not represented in the first tow surveys. Farm households 
which are excluded from these surveys are covered by the Noka Chosa 
(Farm Household Economy Survey, FHES) conducted by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (with a sample size of 16,000 farm 
households) in the mid-1970s. 
Due to the confidentiality requirement of government surveys, 
individual household data collected for these surveys is not accessible 
to private researchers not acting in an official capacity. For a very 
few of the available micro studies, see for example, Toshiyuki Mizoguchi, 
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Personal Savings and Consumption in Japan (Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1970); 
Mitsuo Saito, ffKojin Chochiku no keiryo bunseki" (Econometric analysis of 
personal savings), Kokumin keizai zasshi, Vol. 140, No. 4, (October 
1979), pp. 1-31; and Albert Ando, "Lifecycle kasetsu ni motozuku shohi 
chochiku kodo no bunsekif? (Analysis of consumption-saving behaviors based 
on the lifecycle hypothesis), Keizai Bunseki, forthcoming. 
20a 
A further revision of the NIPA was released by the Economic 
Planning Agency in January 1986. The base year was shifted to 1980 and 
some significant revisions were introduced from 1976 onward. The house-
hold saving ratio was lowered by one percentage point for 1983, for 
example. These changes which came too late to be incorporated here, do 
not affect our observations in this paper in any essential manner. 
21 
The major difference between the NIPA and the FIES is in the 
treatment of imputed rent with capital consumption and health insurance 
premiums. Modifying the NIPA definitions to fit the FIES definition, I 
have found that the saving ratio which was 19-20 per cent in 1979-80 in 
the NIPA is equivalent to 29 percent in the FIES definition. Hence, the 
household sector's average saving ratio exceed that of worker households 
by 7 percentage points. Another interest source material is the annual 
survey of savings conducted by the Central Council for Savings Promotion 
(an organization associated with the Bank of Japan), Chochiku ni kansuru 
yoron chosa (A survey of public opinion on saving), starting in 1953. 
22 
The FIES for the 1930s gives the saving ratio at about 11-14 per 
cent. See Bank of Japan, Hundred-Year Statistic of the Japanese Economy 
(Tokyo: Bank of Japan, 1966), pp. 356-57. 
23 
The best study published at the time was Miyohei Shinohara, "The 
Structure of Savings and the Consumption Function in Postwar Japan,ff 
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Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 67, No. 6 (December 1959), pp. 
589-603. 
24 
This explanation may be related to the permanent income or habit 
persistence hypothesis. See for example, Kazushi Ohkawa, ffChochiku ritsu 
no choki hendo — kojin chochiku o chusin to suru daiichiji sekkinf! (Long-
term changes in the saving ratio), Kezai Kenkyu, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May 
1970), pp. 129-36; Kunio Yoshihara, !fThe Growth Rate as a Determinant of 
the Saving Ratio, ffHitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2 
(February 1972), pp. 60-72; and Chikashi Moriguchi, f!Makuro keiryo modern 
ni miru nihon keizai no kozo henka to seisakuteki imiff (Structural 
changes in the Japanese economy in the recent decades: from a 
macroeconometric viewpoint), Keizai Kenkyu, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 
1979), pp. 20-29. 
25 
The effects of inflation on saving has been analyzed in a number 
of papers. See for example, Hiroshi Niida, "Changes in Personal Saving 
Behavior under the Inflationary Process in Japan,!! mimeograph, January 
1983. 
A / 
Real disposable income per capita grew at a rate of 8.0 percent 
from 1965 to 1973 and 1.7 per cent form 1973 to 1983. 
27 
For details of Japan1s income tax system in recent years, see 
Kazuo Sato "Economic Laws and the Household Economy in Japan: Lags in 
Policy Response to Economic Changes,f! in Kozo Yamamura and Gary 
Saxonhouse, eds., Law and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, forthcoming). 
28 
An individual (not a household) can claim a tax exemption on 
interest on deposits up t the combined principal of $60,000. 
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29The Bank of Japan statistics show that nearly 60 per cent of all 
personal financial savings are tax exe.pt. Kazuo Sato, "Economic Laws 
and the Household Economy in Japan." 
30This rate is 20 per cent, if interest income is reported together 
with other household income; 35 per cent if interest income is taxed 
separately. 
31Note that employers! and employees! contributions to social 
security are excluded form both household income and saving. 
32Kazuo Sato, "Economic Law and the Household Economy in Japan/1 and 
"Supply-Side Economics: A Comparison of the U.S. and Japan/1 
Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1985), pp. 105-28. 
33In the United States, the household saving ratio has been 
declining steadily. Sometime in the 1970s, S ^ crossed over total S. In 
the above framework, the net sum of saving out of labor income and 
capital income has been slightly negative. Negative saving of the 
retired must have overwhelmed the positive saving of workers and 
rentiers. 
34 
There is a burgeoning amount of literature published on this 
topic. For a recent survey, see Lawrence Kotlikoff, "Taxation and 
Saving: A Neoclassical Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol* 
22, No. 4, (December 1984), pp. 1576-629. 
35 
The Green Card is a small-saver identification card on which an 
individual is required to register all nontaxable deposits in his or her 
name. The measure was proposed in an attempt to make abuse of the system 
more difficult. The Green Card program was approved by the Diet in early 
1980, but was shelved after strenuous lobbying efforts of financial 
interests. The fate of this program has been the topic of discussion 
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through 1984. At the moment, the small-saver tax exemption program is 
still in effect. However, a stricter vigilance over the system was 
instituted as of January 1986 by requiring depositors to show their IDs 
(Yomiuri Shimbus, January 5, 1986). 
Using the quintile data of the FIES, Naoyuki Yoshino, "Nihon no 
chochiku kozo ni tsuite--maruyu no koka o megutte11 (On the structure of 
Japanses saving—with special reference to the Small-Saver Tax Exemption 
Program). Kikan Gendai Keizai, No. 58 (Fall 1984), pp. 55-68, finds that 
the maximum limit of the small-saver tax exemption has positive effect on 
financial saving at lower income brackets. 
37 
On this point, see Martin Feldstein, !fSocial Security, Induced 
Retirement and Aggregate Capital Accumulation," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 82, No. 5 (September 1974), pp. 905-26. A recent Japanese 
study notes that the amount of pension benefits is an important determi-
nant in the labor supply decisions of the elderly. See Toshiaki 
Tachibanaki and Keiko Shimono, "Labor Supply of the Elderly," Keizai 
Kenkyu, Vol. 36, No. 3, (July 1985), pp. 239-50. 
For general discussion, on other countries as well as Japan, see 
George M. von Furstenberg, ed., Social Security versus Private Saving 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979). Empirical studies in this field in 
Japan are scarce. See for example, Yokio Noguchi, "Wagakuni koteki 
nenkin no shomondai" (Several problems in Japan1s public pensions), 
Kikan Gendai Keizai, No. 50 (Fall 1982), pp. 18-33. For a survey of the 
literature, see Fumiko Mikami, "Koreika shakai ni okeru kakei chochiku to 
shakai hosho" (Household saving and social security in an aging society), 




See for example, Ryutaro Komiya, f!The Supply of Personal Savings," 
in Ryutaro Komiya, ed., Postwar Economic Growth in Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966) pp. 157-81; Hisao Kanamori, 
Ninon Keizai o do miruka (How to look at the Japanese economy)(Tokyo: 
Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1967); Tuvia Blumenthal, 
Saving in Postwar Japan, Harvard East Asian Monograph No. 35 (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard Asian Research Center, 1970); Andrea Blotho, Japan: An 
Economic Survey, 1953-1973 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); 
Miyohei Shinohara, "The Determinants of Postwar Savings Behavior in 
Japan/1 in Franco Modigliani et. al, eds., The Determinants of National 
Savings and Wealth (New York: St. Martin1s Press, 1983), pp. 201-18; and 
Yashior Horie, "Kakei chochiku ritsu no dokoff (Movemenet of the household 
saving ratio), in Bank of Japan, Kinfyu Kenkyu, Vol. 4, No. 3, (August 
1985), pp. 45-107. 
40 
For adaptive expectations, we have: 
YP = (1 - p)Y^ + pY = pY + p(l - p)Y^ + p(l - p)2Y_2 + ... 
1 S p > 0. 
When Y has been growing at the rate of g, we have: 
YP/ -r 1/(1 + g/p. 
41 
Friedman notes that k is dependent on the interest rate, 
demographic factors, and the proportion of human to nonhuman wealth. See 
Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function (Princeton: Univer-
sity Press, 1957). 
42 
Furthermore, adaptive expectations which are backward-looking are 
not compatible with the permanent income hypotheses, because permanent 
income depends logically on the stream of future incomes. On this 
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critique, see for example, Robert E. Hall, "Stochastic Implication of the 
Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence, 
"Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No. 6 (December 1978), pp. 
1971-1987. If adaptive expectations are replaced by rational expecta-
tions, the negative relationship between the saving ratio and the growth 
rate is not observed. The lifecycle saving hypothesis, regarded an 
equivalent to the permanent income hypothesis, also had to face the same 
sort of problems when applied to the aggregate time-series. 
43 
Both this proportion and the saving ratio peaked in 1974. For an 
illustration of these findings, see Tsuneo Ishikawa and Kazuo Ueda, "The 
Bonus Payment System and Japanese Personal Savings," in Masahiko Aoki, 
ed., The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm, pp. 133-93, especially 
p. 136. 
44 
See among others Mizoguchi, Personal Savings and Consumption in 
Japan: Shinohara, "The Determinants of Postwar Savings Behavior in 
Japan"; Miyohei Shinohara, "Chochiku ritsu no nazo" (The puzzle of the 
saving ratio), Chochiku Jiho, No. 127 (March 1981), pp. 2-12; and Miyohei 
Shinohara, Keizai taikoku no seisui (The rise and fall of economic 
superpowers)(Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 1982), Chapter 5. The most recent 
exercise is offered by Ishikawa and Ueda in their article, "The Bonus 
Payment System and Japanese Personal Savings," and their hypothesis is 
called the habit-buffer-income hypothesis. They argue that "households 
distinguish bonus earnings from the rest of their income and regard them 
as a sort of buffer income, capable of being dispensed with 
discretionarily." They find that workers normally save one half of their 
bonuses (p. 134). 
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45 
The common practice in Japanese households is that husbands give 
their paychecks to their wives who are in charge of household budgeting. 
It is suggested that wives save a great deal, as they anticipate that 
they will outlive their husbands, 
46 
For instance, the payment schedule of housing mortgages is geared 
to the salary-bonus schedule. 
47 
For a discussion of this view, see Takao Komine, Ninon keizai 
tekioryoku no tankyu (A study of the adaptability of the Japanese econo-
my) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 1980), pp. 96-98. 
48 
Yutaka Kosai and Yoshitaro Ogino, The Contemporary Japanese 
Economy (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 114-15, 
49 
For a more detailed discussion, see Kazuo Sato, "Wages, Bonuses, 
and Saving in Japan/1 mimeograph, 1985. 
50 
This hypothesis is by no means a new one, for example, see Alan 
Spiro, "Wealth and the Consumption Function," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 70, No. 4 (August 1962) pp. 339-54; and Michael Evans, ffThe 
Importance of Wealth in the Consumption Function," Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 75, No. 4 (August 1967), pp. 330-51. Komine also 
expresses his preference for this hypothesis in the Japanese case but 
without any factual test in Ninon keizai tekioryoku no tankyu. 
51 
For the sake of simplicity, Y is taken to be current income. It 
can be replaced by permanent income. 
In national accounting statistics, consumption of fixed capital is 
netted out of changes in both saving and wealth. 
C O
 t 
If the planning horizon is long, w* may be set at a very high 
level. In such a case, wealth adjustment is seen to be imperfect and the 
speed of adjustment (A) is low. Such a model is given by: 
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s t = A ( w t Y t " V i } > m > 0 
This derivative of the above equation is given by: 
st - \W*AYt/Yt +AAW* + (1 - -V)st-1(l « AYt/Yt) 
In a steady state where income growth is constant, both the saving ratio 
and the wealth-income ratio coverage to their steady-state values, s and 
w. It is easily seen that s responds negatively and w responds positive-
ly to income growth. Thus, it is possible that movement of s and w in 
recent years have occurred while w* has remained unchanged--an important 
point for future research. 
54 
This subsection is based on Kazuo Sato, "Japan1s Land-Price 
Determination: a Longitudinal Study," mimeograph, 1982, 
55 
The single most important factor that has made Japan's wealth 
distribution unequal is the appreciation of land value. Nouiyuki 
Takayama and Mitsutalia Togashi, "A Note on Wealth Distribution in 
Japan," The Philippines Economic Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (July 1980), pp. 
163-88. 
56 2 2 
The average floor space per house rose form 60m in 1950 to 80m 
in 1980 according to the Census of Population. The average lot size per 
house, however, does not seem to have matched this increase. 
The most dramatic indicator of quality improvements may be the 
diffusion of flush toilets, which rose form 8.9 per cent of all houses in 
1963 to 45.9 per cent in 1978 and 59.1 per cent in 1983 according to the 
quinquennial National Housing Survey. Other more modern facilities like 
central heating and air conditioning can also be cited. 
C O 
However, average family size continues to decline--from 5.0 
persons in 1955 to 3.3 in 1980, thereby raising floor space per resident 
2 2 from 12m to 24m over the same period. Census of population. 
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59 
For the spread of consumer durables over time, see the Economic 
Planning Agency, Shoisha doko chosa (Survey of consumer finances). 
Smaller consumer appliances and electronic items are well diffused, but 
furniture is not because of the space limitation as well as its high 
cost, 
An alternative explanation would be that the rise in w is a 
result of slow adjustment with no corresponding change in w* when income 
growth shifted to a lower level * The slow adjustment arises, inter alia, 
because of the quasi-fixed nature of a large portion of saving (e.g., 
repayment of housing loans, life insurance premiums, private annuity 
subscriptions, and the like). Consequently, wealth has increased at a 
faster rate than income. 
For a cross-section analysis of lifecycle savings, see Mitsuo 
Saito, ffKojin chochiku no keiryo bunseki11; and Albert Ando, "Lifecycle 
kasetsu ni motozuku shohi chochiku kodo no bunseki.!f 
For assessing the importance of housing saving, see Charles Y. 
Horioka, Household Saving in Japan: The Importance of Target Saving for 
Education and Housing, Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, May 1985. 
Horie, f!Kakei chohiku ritsu no doko,tf conducts a heroic exercise of 
breaking down financial savings into various motives on the basis of the 
Bank of Japan1s questionnaire survey. 
Over the period 1978-83, land account for 42 per cent of the total 
cost of a new dwelling. Masao Kawakami, ,!Jinsei 80-nen no shogai sekkei" 
(Planning for an 80-year lifecycle), Chochiku to keizai, No. 143 (March 
1985), pp. 31-41. 
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64 
In 1983? the average acquisition price of a new house was five 
times the average annual household income, 39 per cent of which was 
self-financed. Kawakami, "Jinsei 80-nen no shogai sekkei.!f 
65 
Note that in the national accounting convention, households' 
purchases of new houses and second-hand houses (including house lots) 
form the business sector are part of household capital formation, whereas 
purchases from other households are not. When purchased on loans, an 
increase in W^ is offset by an equal increase in VL ,. By paying off the 
principal of the loan, W , is reduced, thereby increasing the total W. 
This constitutes a part of household saving. It may also be noted that 
interest paid on housing loans is not tax-deductible. 
Improving upon Kazuo Sato, "Saving of Japan1 s Worker Households ,ff 
mimeograph, November 1976, Toshimasa Shiba, "The Personal Savings Func-
tion of Urabn Worker Households in Japan," Review of Economic and Statis-
tics, Vol, 61, No. 2 (May 1979), pp. 206-13, considered the urban land 
price index/CPI as an explanatory variable in the Japanese worker house-
hold saving function. 
It is necessary to explain why w* has continued to rise as a 
referee has pointed out. My tentative answer is that the income elastic-
ity of demand for wealth has been above unity, especially via housing 
demand and an increasing life after retirement. However, an alternative 
hypothesis is possible that w^ c was set at a high level to begin with and 
the realized w has been steadily converging toward it. This hypothesis 
is currently being investigated by the author. 
67 -
An EPA study, Seinosuke Niea and Noriki Sasaki, "Kinrosha no 
teinen taishoku go no seikei shushi no suikei11 (Estimation of worker 
household budget after retirement), Keizai Bunseki, No. 75 (June 1979), 
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pp. 1-1055 speculates that personal savings of worker households fall 
short of providing self-support for retirement. The lifecycle budget 
sequence discussed in the text is outlined in detail in the Economic 
Planning Agency, Kokumin seikatsu hakusho, 1984 (White paper on people's 
lives, 1984)(Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1984). See laso 
Kawakami, ffJinsei 80-nen no shogai sekkei." This study asserts that a 
family breaks even after housing cost. There is a puzzling phenomenon of 
positive saving by old-age households as reported in the FIES. Ando, 
"Lifecycle kasetsu ni motozuku shohi chochiku kodo no bunseki," points 
out that this is because their household heads are still working and 
saving; those who have retired and therefore must be dissaving are merged 
into their children's households who maintain positive saving. 
68 
Severence pay fell from 47.3 times monthly salary equivalents 
(MSE) in 1969 to 39.1 (MSE) in 1983 for college graduates and from 52.8 
(MSE) to 43.0 (MSE) for senior-high graduates. Data based on a survey by 
the Central Labor Commission as quoted in Toko Keizai tokei nenkan, 
various issues. 
69 
The proportion of old generations living with married children is 
reported to be 50 per cent in Japan as against 53 per cent in Thailand, 3 
per cent in the United States, 2 per cent in the United Kingdom and 9 per 
cent in France by the Office of the Prince Minister, An Inter-
national Comparative Study of the Life of the Old Generation, as quoted 
in Yomiuri Shimbun, September 15, 1981. 
The proportion of nuclear families to all kinship families has 
increased from 63.4 per cent in 1960 to 75.4 per cent in 1980 according 
to the Census of Population. 
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Housing advertisements in Japanese newspapers often feature such 
arrangements for amicable coexistence between the generations. In-law 
problems are ubiquitous in Japan.. 
72 
The population share of the three metropolitan areas is projected 
to increase from 47.22 per cent in 1985 to 48.07 per cent in 1995 accord-
ing to the Population Problem Institute of the Ministry of Welfare. 
(1983 projections as reported in Toyo Keizai, Keisai Tokei Kenkan 1984, 
p. 48.) 
73 
The population growth rate fell from a little over 1 per cent per 
annum in the early 1970s to slightly over 0.6 per cent in 1984. It is 
projected to fall to 0.4 per cent by 2000 and become negative by 2010. 
74 
Relative to Japan (100), the per capita balance of financial 
assets is reported to be United States (150), Germany (78), and the 
United Kingdom (70). Yomiuri Shimbun, January 20, 1985. 
Measures that have been discussed are the elimination of the 
small-saver tax exemption program, the expansion of indirect tax 
(value-added tax and the like), and the simplification of the income tax 
schedule with lower marginal tax rates on high income. 
The NIPA gives a profit breakdown by sector but no employee 
compensations by sector. We have taken series on labor cost (v 
salaries, and fringe benefits) for private nonfinancial cornnr-a+--; 
'-wipuidLions as 
reported in the Ministry of Finance, Hojin kigyo tokei n ^ T m 
—^ ^ -
:
--^ --------Jl£!SP£ C o r p o r a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e s t a t i s t i c s annua l ) . GDP a t f a c to r cos t i s th^
 C11 
ld
 sum ot gross 
operating surplus and employee compensation. This procedure 
employee compensations and sector GDP due to the omission of 
enterprises1 labor cost. 
-75-
The gross fixed capital stock series is available for nonfinancial 
corporations from the EPA estimates. In 1975, the gross stock was 22.4 
per cent higher than the net stock, 
78 
Suppose that this aggregate production function is of the constant 
elasticity of substitution variety, namely: 
Y~P = (AK)~P + (BL)""P, p = (1 - o)/o 
where Y = output. K = capital, L = labor, a = elasticity of substitution, 
and A and B are coefficients which vary over time. The marginal product 
of capital is: , 
MPK = A~P(K/Y)~1/(J 
When capital is paid its marginal product, we have: 
capitalfs share = (AK/Y) P 
Capitalfs share and the capital-output ratio covary inversely when p > 0 
or 0 < 0* < 1. When this equation is estimated for the secondary sector, 
it is found that a = ,50 and A was nearly constant. This finding implies 
that technical change was taken form in steady increases in B, i.e., 
labor augmentation. The regression equation (1958-1982) is: 
log (capital's share) = -.984 log K/Y - .0014 (t-1976) - .135 
(.052) (.0003) (.010) 
2 (Standard errors are in parentheses.) R = .9801, d.w. = 1.64. We thus 
have G = .50 and A/A = .0014. 
79 
For a discussion of this policy, see Juro Teranishi, Nihon no 
keizai hatten to kinfyu (Money, capital, and banking in Japanese economic 
development) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982). For a reexamination, see 
Horiuchi, "Economic Growth and Financial Allocation in Postwar Japan,ff 
O A 
How effective credit rationing was in Japan is a topic popularly 
discussed in many studies. See Kazumasa Iwata and Koichi Hamada, Kinyu 
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seisaku to ginko kodo (Monetary policy and bank behaviors) (Tokyo: 
Keizai, 1980), Chapter 6. 
Young workers moved permanently to cities. Middle-aged farmers 
either left farms for good or found principal jobs in nearby cities which 
allowed them to spend time on farms on weekends. During the week, farms 
were attended by the elderly and the housewives. 
82 
The ratio of job openings to applications reached a peak in 1971 
and once again in 1974. (The ratio was 6.8 and 6.7 in the respective 
years for junior-high graduate and 4.0 and 3.9 for senior high graduates, 
according to Ministry of Labor data.) 
go 
My view is that the aggregate production function remained 
unchanged through the period except for a significant fall in potential 
growth. The oil shocks, however, may have made the substitution of 
capital for oil more attractive, but this does not necessarily imply the 
same for labor. See Jiro Nemoto, f!0n Substitution Possibilities between 
Energy and Non-Energy Inputs" (in Japanese), Economic Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 1984), pp. 139-58. The Economic Planning Agency, 
Nihon keizai no genkyo (The present state of the Japanese economy), 1984, 
pp. 225^42, presents a contrary view stating that the elasticity of 
capital-labor substitution fell after the first, oil shock. J. Sachs and 
D. Lipton, "The Supply Approach to Oil Shocks and the Slowdown in Japa-
nese Economic Growth," Shukan Toyo Keizai, special issue No. 57 (July 10, 
1381, pp. 124-35, argue that the oil shock reduce capital and energy 
inputs to such an extent that economic growth slowed. My view is given 
by Kazuo Sato, "Shifts from High Growth to Low Growth Steady States: 
Japan's Corporate Sector," mimeograph, March 1985. 
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In Japan1s conventional national accounting practices, consumption 
of fixed capital is based on book values rather than replacement values. 
No valuation adjustment is performed. Thus, the observed fall in the 
depreciation ratio is spurious. In fact, the net fixed capital stock is 
estimated on an assumption of a constant depreciation ratio of about 10.5 
per cent. 
or 
The fall would have been further magnified if a capital 
consumption valuation adjustment had been adopted. 
86 
For 1970-82, the following regression equation is obtained: 
CS/GDP = .929 NP/GDP - .620 (DV/GDP) - .014 NW/GDP + .026 
(.018) (.099) (.004) (.014) 
R2 = .9974, d.w. = 1.73 
In a steady state, (DV/GDP)^ = (DV/DGP) = (NP/GDP) - (CS/GDP). 
In the United States, Denisonfs Law asserts that personal saving 
and corporate saving are perfect substitutes so that their sum maintains 
a stable fraction of GNP. This substitution possibility between the two 
types of saving requires an examination, though in Japan the sum of two 
types of saving has not been a constant fraction of GNP. Also, the fact 
that only a small fraction of corporate stocks are held by private 
individuals must be taken into account. 
87 
The average bank loan rate was 8.5 per cent in 1955-59, 8.0 per 
cent in 1960-64, 7.5 per cent in 1965 per cent in 1965-69, 7.7 per cent 
in 1970-74, 7.5 per cent in 1975-79, 7.4 per cent in 1980-84. Bank of 
Japan, Economic Statistics Annual. The implicit interest rate on loans 
and discounts, as reported in the Ministry of Finance, Hojin kigyo tokei 
nempo (Annual statistical reports on incorporated firms), is about 1 
percentage point higher than the above figures. 
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PR 
Even the NIPA rate of return is overstated due to the lack of a 
valuation adjustment on capital consumption allowances. If properly 
adjusted on this count r should be reduced by a little over 1 percentage 
point. 
89 
For more detailed computations, see Masahiko Aoki, "Aspects of the 
Japanese Firm,11 in Masahiko Aoki, ed. , The Economic Analysis of the 
Japanese Firm (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1984), pp. 3-43. 
90 
See Takatoshi Nakamura, ff Japan's Giant Enterprises---Their Power 
and Influence,M Japanses Economic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Summer 1984), 
pp. 50-90, especially pp. 64-67. According to the Economic Planning 
Agency, The Present State of the Japanese Economy, 1984, p. 215, r seems 
to have been roughly equal in Japan and the U.S. in recent years. 
91 
See Dale W. Jorgenson, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior," 
American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (May 1963), pp. 247-59. 
92 
For simplicity, disregard the existence of nonmonetary financial 
assets. Then we have 
total assets (TA) = real assets (K) + monetary assets 
= liabilities (D) + net worth (NW) 
We have an income equation 
(1 - t)(pK - iD - 6K) = rNW 
where t = tax rate, p = MPK, i = interest rate, and 6 = depreciation 
ratio. As an adequate rate of return, r is determined to be equal to 
r = 1 - IIK/NW 
where II = the rate of real asset appreciation. We then have 
pK/TA = (K/TA)(6 - 11/1 - t) + (i/1 - t))(l - t(D/TA)). 
The average rate of return on total assets (left-hand side) is equated to 
the user cost of capital (right-hand side) in equilibrium. In this 
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equation, K/TA and D/TA should be measured in flows rather than in 
stocks. 
93 
Financial institutions derive earnings principally from interest 
received on their loans to firms and households. Their income, after 
subtracting interest paid on deposits and operating expenses, is partly-
distributed as dividends to stockholders and partly retained as saving. 
As their capital formation falls far short of their saving, they have 
positive net lending. 
94 
The Service Revolution has received a great deal of fanfare in 
Japan as a harbinger of the post-industrial society. See for example, 
Ryuichiro Tachi, "The !Softization1 of the Japanese Economy,ff Japanese 
Economic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1985), pp. 67-104. 
95 
The ratio of gross fixed capital stock to sectoral GDP (both in 
1975 prices) in 1983 was 1.65 for all private industry, 7.19 in the 
primary sector (agriculture), 1.81 in the secondary sector (mining, 
manufacturing, construction, electricity-gas-water), and 1.04 in the 
tertiary sector (transportation and communications, wholesale and retail 
trade, finance, real estate, and services). In the secondary sector, its 
most dynamic industry, heavy manufacturing, has a relatively low 
capital-output ratio of 1.31, as against 2.10 for light manufacturing. 
96 
Adjusting items are determined by purchases of land, net + 
purchases of intangible assets, n.e.c, net + statistical discrepancy -
capital transfers received, net. 
97 
This items contains: purchases of intangible assets from the rest 
of the world, net + statistical discrepancy - capital transfers from the 
rest of the world, net. 
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98 
For a broader discussion of the government sector, see the Noguchi 
chapter in this volume. For a more detailed discussion of the external 
sector, see Volume II of the study by the Japanese Political Economy 
Research Committee. For the financial aspects of the macroeconomic 
balance, see the Horiuchi and Hamada chapter in this volume. 
99 
The outstanding federal debt held by the public was 36 per cent of 
GNP in 1984 (Survey of Current Business). 
Suppose that deficits and interest on debt are financed by bond 
issues? and deficits are kept at a constant fraction of GDP, then, the 
debt-income ratio converges to a finite value, if and only if, the 
interest rate is less than the growth rate of nominal GDP. In the last 
five years, the latter was 6 per cent while the former was about 8 per 
cent. 
This subsection is based on Kazuo Sato and Sheng Yann Lii, MThe 
Yen Exchange Rate, Trade Balance, and Capital Flows: The Case of Japan," 
a paper presented to the Second Conference on U.S.-Asia Economic Rela-
tions, New York, September 30 - October 2, 1985. 
102 
See Economic Planning Agency, Keizai hakusho (Annual report on 
the Japanese economy), 1984, Chapter 2; and Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry, Tsusho hakusho (Annual report on international 
trade), 1984, Chapter 3. 
103 
Government economists have based their analyses on a historical 
pattern of development stages in which a country moves from the position 
of a net borrower to repaying foreign debt, to a "premature" lender 
country (capital exports based on a surplus in the trade account), then 
to a "mature" lender country (capital exports based on investment in-
come). Japan is alleged to have reached the premature lender stage. 
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104Economic Planning Agency, Keizai hakusho, 1985, speculates that 
the push for capital exports would be weakened as the aging population 
would exert a downward pressure on excess saving* 
A good example is the Asset Doubling Plan (Shissan Baizo Ron), 
proposed in the spring of 1984 by an elder statesman of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Kiichi Miyazawa, calling for the doubling of Japan1s 
assets over the next ten years. Asahi Shimbun, June 7, 1984; Kiichi 
Miyazawa, "Watakushi no shisan baizo-ron" (My 'Asset Doubling Plan')* an 
interview by Mastaka Kosaka, Bungei shunju, July 1984, pp. 94-114. 
The proposal asserts that, owing to major technological break-
throughs providing investment opportunities, the country can grow at the 
rate of 5 to 5.5 per cent. The nation should not miss this opportunity 
to expand its housing and social capital stocks. Increased investment 
will reduce the dependence on external demand. A higher growth rate 
would reduce the dependence on external demand. A higher growth rate 
would expand government revenue, thereby solving the deficit problem as 
well. 
The proposal has been poorly received and quickly forgotten. The 
plan itself is internally inconsistent. In addition, the plan does not 
set a particularly ambitious target, as net fixed assets doubled in the 
preceding ten years without any such plan. 
Table 1. Investment and savings, as percent of GNP (GDP) 
Table 2. Capital-output ratios: net fixed capital stock/GDP 
(in current prices), 1970 and 1980 
Sources: Capital stocks from OECD, Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital, 
1955-1980 (Paris: OECD), 1983); GDP from OECD, National 
Accounts, 1964-1981 (Paris: OECD, 1983). For Japan, Economic 
Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 1983 
Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1983). For the United 
States, Survey of Current Business, March 1980, February 1981, 
and Ocober 1982, 
a In 1975 prices. 
Table 3» Household wealthy as multiples of household 
disposable income, 1980 
Sources: Japan, Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National 
Accounts, 1933. U.S., R. Ruggles and N. RugglesV iTIntergrated 
Economic Accounts for the United States, 1947-80," Survey of 
Current Business, May 1982, 1-53. — ' 
Life insurance 
b 
noncorporate nonfarm equity, farm business equity, estates 
and trusts. 
Table 4. Rates of interest and inflation, 1982-84, per cent 





WPI CPI short--term long-•term 
WPT CPI WPI CPI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Japan 6.8 7.4 -.2 2.2 7.0 4.6 7.6 5.2 
U.S. 10.5 12.2 1.9 4.6 8.6 5.9 10.3 7.6 
Canada 11.3 12.9 4.5 7.0 6.8 4.3 8.4 5.9 
France 13.1 13.8 11.8 9.6 1.3 3.5 2.0 4.2 
Germany 6«9 8.2 3.4 3.7 3.2 3.2 4.8 4.5 
Italy 18. 8a 18.0 11.3 14.0 7.5 4.8 6.7 4.0 
U.K. 10.5 11.5 6.4 6.1 4.1 4.4 5.1 5.4 
SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics, August 1985 
(series numbers are (1) 60b, (2) 61, (3) 63, (4) 64). 
a 19845 the first two quarters only. 
Table 5. Population and labor force 
Sources: life expectancy and dependency ratio, Toyko Keixai^ Keizai tokei 
menkan, 1985 (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 1985). 
labor force participation ratio, OECD, Labour Force Statistics -
1970-1981 (Paris: OECD, 1983). 
65 and older population/total population 
b
 1981. 
Table 6. Household saving ratios , 1951-1984 5 percent 
SOURCES: (1) Prime Minister1s Office, Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(2) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries, Farm, Housejiold, 
Economy Survey, 
(3) Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Income 
Statistics. 1978 (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1978) 
(4) Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 
1985 (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1985) and earlier issues, 
a 
b Saving/disposable income, variously defined in sources. 
c All households including individual proprietors and nonprofit institutions. 
^ 1965-69, excluding nonprofit insitutions, 
based on fiscal-year data. 
Table 7. Composition of Japan's household saving, 1979-31 (conjectural exercise) 
SOURCE: See explanation in the text, 
* observed value 
'** conjectural value, based on some evidence 
i1 conjectural value, assumed 
Table 8. Household net worth, end of year? 1953-83 




3 w3f W3d VW3 w ( W 2 T % (.real) P2/P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
~or ~Wi (9T 
1953 2.52 .51 .68 .18 .953 
1954 2.75 .50 .71 .21 .962 
1955 2.88 .63 .86 .24 .923 
1956 3.13 .64 .87 .24 .952 
1957 3.08 .64 .91 .27 .994 
1958 3.24 .71 1.02 .31 .981 
1959 3.28 .80 1.14 .34 1.021 
1960 3.38 .85 1.22 .37 1.035 
1961 3.26 .84 1.22 .39 1.128 
1962 3.11 .83 1.26 .43 1.071 
1963 2.96 .81 1.27 .46 1.071 
1964 2.88 .41 .84 1.32 .48 1.25 4.13 .38 1.064 
1965 2.72 .44 .86 1.36 .50 1.30 4.02 .43 1.018 
1966 2.64 .48 .86 1.39 .53 1.34 4.00 .47 1.021 
1967 2.66 .53 .87 1.41 .57 1.39 4.05 .50 1.046 
1968 2.67 .56 .89 1.46 .57 1.45 4.12 .54 1.003 
1969 2.76 .59 .94 1.54 .60 1.53 4.29 .58 1.024 
1970 2.80 .62 .93 1.51 .59 1.55 4.35 .62 1.007 
1971 2.88 .65 .99 1.60 .62 1.63 4.51 .67 .967 
1972 3.30 .76 1.15 1.79 .64 1.90 5.20 .69 1.101 
1973 3.27 .84 1.02 1.66 .64 1.86 5.13 .69 1.208 
1974 2.62 .81 .95 1.54 .59 1.76 4.39 .75 1.068 
1975 2.46 .80 .98 1.61 .63 1.78 4.24 .80 1.000 
1976 2.32 .84 1.07 1.67 .61 1.91 4.22 .85 .997 
1977 2.29 .85 1.08 1.75 .67 1.93 4.22 .89 .955 
1978 2.41 
.87 1.15 1.85 .70 2.02 4.44 .92 .947 
1979 2.69 .97 1.18 1.94 .75 2.16 4.85 .95 1.026 
1980 2.89 .98 1.21 1.97 .76 2.19 5.08 .98 1.002 
1981 3.11 
.97 1.30 2.09 .79 2.27 5.38 1.00 .974 
1982 3.20 
.97 1.39 2.21 .82 2.36 1.01 1.01 .963 
1983 3.17 
.95 1.46 2.33 .87 2.41 5.58 1.01 .945 
Table 9. Land-income ratios, households, end of year, 1951-1983 
private urban 
land/household land-income ratio 
SOURCES: (1), (2), Stastics Bureau, Prime Minister1s OFfice, Japan Statistical 
Yearbook, various issues; (3)-(7), 1969-83, computer from Economic 
Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 1985 and earlier 
issues; 1951-68, land values estimated by the product of land area and 
land price index, spliced to the 1969 benchmark values, original data 
from Japan Statistical Yearbook. 
NOTES: (3)-(7), Land is the market value, income is household disposable income 
where households include nonprofit institutions. Except for (7), land 
refers to that owned by households excluding nonprofit institutions, 
(4) farmland includes pastures, etc. (6) total includes forests. 
Table 10. The capital-output ratio (K/Y) and capitalfs 
share (P/Y), 1955-1983 
SOURCES & NOTES: 
Nonfinancial corporations: (1) K = net fixed capital stock (end of year) 1975 
prices, from Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 1985 
and earlier issues; Y = GDP at factor cost in 1975 prices, from K. Sato, "Shifts 
from high-growth to low growth steady states...", mimo., 1985. (2) P = consump-
tion of fixed capital + operating surplus; Y = as above, both in current prices. 
Second sector: (1) K = gross fixed capital stock (end of year) in 1975 prices 
(installation basis), from Economic Planning Agency, Gross Fixed Capital Stocks; 
Y = GDP in 1975 prices, taken from Economic Planning Agency Annua1 Report on 
National Accounts, and OECD, National Accounts, 1983 earlier issues. (2) P = 
Consumption of fixed capital + operation surplus, Y = P + employee compensation, 
both in current prices. The earlier series for 1955-1974 are from T.P. Hill, 
Profits and Rates of Return (Paris: OECD, 1979). 
mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity/gas/water, transportation and 
communications. 





SOURCES: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Income 
Statistics, 1978, for 1960-64; ibid., Annual Report on 
National Accounts, 1985, for later years. 
NOTES: (1) Gross capital formation/GDP at factor cost, in current 
prices both relating to the nonfinancial corporate sector 
(2) Business gross fixed capital formation/GDP in purchasers 
value, in current prices, all economy. 
(3) Growth rate in GDP in 1975 prices, industry excluding 
agriculture. 
Table 12. Capital's share, nonfinancial corporate sector 
as percent of GDP 
Table 13. Net profits (NP), dividends (DV), saving (S), net invest-
ment (NI), and net worth (NW) : nonfinancial corporate 
sector, 1970-83, as percent of GDP at factor cost 


















SOURCES: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National 
Accounts, 1985 and earlier issues; For sector GDP, see 
K. Sato, "Shifts " 
Table 14. rates of return and implicit interest rates: 
nonfinancial corporate sector, 1970-83 
SOURCE: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National 
Accounts, 1985 and earlier issues. 
Legend: see the text. 
Table 15. Financial structure of corporations, 1980 (percent 
total assets) 
Japan 
Table 16, Net supply of industrial funds to t>Hv~i--
corporations by source, per cent -"--financial 
Table 17. The business sector: saving and investment, as percent 





Table 18. Saving, investment, and net lending by sector, 1965-1983, 
per cent of GDP (in current prices) 
Table 19. The general government account, as percent of GDP 
Expenditure 





SOURCE: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts 
1984 and 1985. ~~ " -±^^^-* 
Final consumption expenditure + gross capital formation -
consumption of fixed capital + purchases of land, net 
Social security benefits - social security contributions + 
assistance grants + property income payable 
c 
Indirect taxes + direct taxe«? + nY-rn--.a--.+•-. 
i-ecu taxes + property income, receivable 
excluding purchases of land 
Table: 20. External balance, percent of GDP 




1 . icco unt 
total goods services factor total goods services factor KO KI 
Year (fob) receipts (cif) payments 
1965 10.9 9.2 1.3 .3 9.8 8.0 1.2 .6 1.0 .12 .49 -.42 
1966 11.0 9.2 1.4 .4 9.7 7.9 1.1 .6 1.2 -.03 .67 -.55 
1967 10.1 8.4 1.3 .4 10.1 8.4 1.1 .6 -.2 -.06 .71 .76 
1968 10.5 8.8 1.3 .3 9.7 7.9 1.1 .6 .7 .61 .75 .64 
1969 11.0 9.2 1.4 .4 9.7 7.8 1.2 .7 1.2 .35 .88 .00 
1970 11.3 9.4 1.4 .5 10.3 8.2 1.3 .7 1.0 .44 .94 .41 
1971 12.3 10.3 1.3 .5 9.8 7.6 1.4 .7 2.5 4.74 .91 3.16 
1972 11.3 9.2 1.3 .6 9.0 6.9 1.4 .6 2.2 1.03 1 .59 .45 
1973 10.8 8.8 1.2 .7 10.8 8.5 1.5 .7 -.0 -1.47 2 .05 .61 
1974 14.5 12.1 1.5 .9 15.5 12.5 1.8 1.1 -.9 .26 .89 2.14 
1975 13.7 11.2 1.6 .9 13.8 10.8 1.9 1.0 -.1 -.15 .68 .67 
1976 14.4 11.9 1.7 .8 13.7 10.8 2.0 .9 .6 .68 .81 .84 
1977 13.9 11.6 1.6 .7 12.3 9.7 1.9 .7 1.5 .86 .75 .07 
1978 11.9 9.9 1.3 .7 10.2 7.8 1.6 .6 1.7 1.08 1 .52 .88 
1979 12.8 10.3 1.4 1.0 13.7 10.7 1.9 .9 -.9 -1.28 1 .62 1.24 
1980 15.2 12.3 1.6 1.2 16.2 12.8 2.1 1.2 -1.1 .44 1 .03 2.56 
1981 16.6 13.4 1.7 1.5 16.1 12.1 2.2 1.7 .5 .27 2 .01 1.83 
1982 16.8 13.1 1.8 1.9 16.1 11.9 2.2 2.0 .7 -.49 2 .56 1.40 
1983 15.8 12.7 1.6 1.5 14.0 10.1 2.5 1.5 1.8 .11 2 .79 1.11 
1984 17.1 13.6 14.1 10.1 3.0 
SOURCE: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts, 1985 and earlier issues; 1984, 
preliminary estimates. 
Notation: DOR = change in official reserves; KO = capital outflow; KI = capital inflow. 
